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THE GHOSTS OF HOMER PLESSY 
Rodney A. Smollat 
INTRODUCTION 
It is 1996 and Plessy v. Ferguson1 is one-hundred years old 
and forty-two years dead. Plessy is forty-two years dead because 
in 1954 in Brown v. Board of Education2 the Supreme Court 
overruled it. But I believe in ghosts, and Homer Adolph Plessy 
left many behind. 
On June 7, 1892, Plessy attempted to board a train traveling 
between New Orleans and Covington, Louisiana, a small town 
thirty miles north of New Orleans near the Louisiana-Mississippi 
state line. He took a vacant seat in a coach designated as for 
whites only. Plessy was one-eighth African blood and seven-
eighths Caucasian and, according to the allegations in the 
lawsuit he filed, a "mixture of colored blood was not discernible 
in him."3 He was ordered by a train conductor to vacate the 
coach and to take a seat in the coach "assigned to persons of the 
colored race,"4 but he refused. He was forcibly ejected with the 
aid of a police officer and thrown in the parish jail. 5 Plessy had 
violated an 1890 Louisiana law providing for separate railway 
carriages for whites and blacks.6 
t Arthur B. Hanson Professor of Law and Director, Institute of Bill of Rights 
Law, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of Willian~ and Mary. 
1. 163 u.s. 537 (1896). 
2. 347 u.s. 483 (1954). 
3. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 541. 
4. Id. at 542. 
5. Id. 
6. See id. at 540-41 (citing 1890 La. Acts 111, p. 152). The Supreme Court 
summarized the pertinent provisions of the legislation: 
The first section of the statute enacts "that all railway companies 
carrying passengers in their coaches in this State, shall provide equal but 
separate accommodations for the white, and colored races, by providing 
two or more passenger coaches for each passenger train, or by dividing 
the passenger coaches by a partition so as to secure separate 
accommodations: Provided, That this section shall not be construed to 
apply to street railroads. No person or persons, shall be admitted to 
occupy seats in coaches, other than, the ones, assigned, to them on 
account of the race they belong to." 
1037 
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The passage of the 1890 Louisiana legislation was in some 
respects historically surprising, for it was passed against the 
backdrop of the peculiarly cosmopolitan and multi-ethnic New 
Orleans society. As Richard Kluger explains, New Orleans was a 
racial bouillabaisse of French, African, Anglo-Saxon, and Indian 
stock unlike any other community in the nation, where "many no 
longer bothered to fret about how racially pure or polluted their 
blood was."7 During Reconstruction in 1869, Louisiana had 
actually passed a law prohibiting segregation by public 
carriers-precisely the reverse of the 1890 law Homer Plessy was 
charged with breaking.8 
A challenge to the 1869 law reached the Supreme Court in 
Hall v. DeCuir.9 Josephine DeCuir, a woman of color, boarded 
the steamboat "Governor Allen" for a trip from New Orleans to 
Hermitage, a landing within Louisiana. The boat master refused 
to let her ride in a whites-only cabin, and she sued him under 
the Louisiana anti-segregation law. The Supreme Court held the 
law unconstitutional. While the Louisiana statute at issue 
purported to outlaw discrimination by common carriers only with 
regard to traffic within Louisiana, the Supreme Court struck the 
I d. 
By the second section it was enacted "that the officers of such 
passenger trains shall have power and are hereby required to assign 
each passenger to the coach or compartment used for the race to which 
such passenger belongs; any passenger insisting on going into a coach or 
compartment to which by race he does not belong, shall be liable to a 
fine of twenty-five dollars, or in lieu thereof to imprisonment for a period 
of not more than twenty days in the parish prison, and any officer of 
any railroad insisting on assigning a passenger to a coach or 
compartment other than the one set aside for the race to which said 
passenger belongs, shall be liable to a fine of twenty-five dollars, or in 
lieu thereof to imprisonment for a period of not more than twenty days 
in the parish prison; and should any passenger refuse to occupy the 
coach or compartment to which he or she is assigned by the officer of 
such railway, said officer shall have power to refuse to carry such 
passenger on his train, and for such refusal neither he nor the railway 
company which he represents shall be liable for damages in any of the 
courts of this State." 
The third section provides penalties for the refusal or neglect of the 
officers, directors, conductors and employes of railway companies to 
comply with the act, with a proviso that "nothing in this act shall be 
construed as applying to nurses attending children of the other race." 
7. RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF 
EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 72 (1975). 
8. Id. at 72-73. 
9. 95 u.s. 485 (1877). 
1996] THE GHOSTS OF HOMER PLESSY 1039 
law down as a violation of the Commerce Clause. Noting that the 
Mississippi River and its tributaries traverse many states, the 
Court concluded that the effect of the statute would be to force 
white passengers in a whites-only cabin who were on a vessel 
coming from a state that permitted or required segregation to 
"share the accommodations of that cabin with such colored 
persons as may come on board afterwards, if the law is 
enforced."10 This the Court found quite reprehensible, for it 
interfered with the dormant prerogative of Congress to legislate 
on such issues under the Commerce Clause. 
The Supreme Court would subsequently find, however, in 
Louisville, New Orleans and Texas Railway Company v. 
Mississippi, 11 that the mirror opposite of the law in Hall-a law, 
like that in Plessy, that required segregation on traffic moving 
intrastate-did not violate the Commerce Clause. So at least as 
far as the Commerce Clause was concerned, it was not a burden 
on interstate commerce to require a black person sitting next to a 
white person to get up and move as the carrier moved into a 
segregated state, but it was an unreasonable burden to require a 
white person to allow a black person into the cabin as the carrier 
moved into a non-segregation state. Go figure. 
So Homer Plessy was caught in the "one-drop" rule, the 
principle that one drop of African-American blood renders a 
person black. The rule embraces a metaphor of purity and 
contamination: White is unblemished and pure, so one drop of 
ancestral black blood renders one black. 12 Plessy challenged the 
1890 Louisiana law as violating the Thirteenth and Fourteenth 
Amendments. In a decision by Justice Henry Billings Brown, 13 
the Supreme Court rejected Plessy's constitutional challenges, 
10. Id. at 489. 
11. 133 u.s. 587 (1890). 
12. Neal Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution is Color-Blind," 44 STAN. L. REV. 
1, 6 (1991). Langston Hughes remarked on the power of that "one drop of Negro 
blood": 
"One drop-you are a Negro! Now, why is that? Why is Negro blood 
so much more powerful than any other kind of blood in the world? If a 
man has Irish blood in him, people will say, 'He's part Irish.' If he has a 
little Jewish blood, they'll say, 'He's half Jewish.' But if he has just a 
small bit of colored blood in him, BAM!-'He's a Negro!' Not, 'He's part 
Negro.' ... That drop is really powerful." 
LANGSTON HUGHES, SIMPLE TAKES A WIFE 201 (1953). 
13. For a portrait of Justice Brown, see Robert Glennon, Jr., Justice Henry Billings 
Brown: Values in Tension, 44 COLO. L. REV. 553 (1973). 
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approving the doctrine of "separate-but-equal," and with it the 
caricature of eqmility known as Jim Crow. 14 It is one-hundred 
years since Plessy and forty-two years since Brown. Just think 
how far we have come. Think hard. 
I. THE PLESSY OPINION 
The majority's opinion was utterly insouciant in its treatment 
of Plessy's Thirteenth Amendment claim, dismissing it in three 
cryptic paragraphs. The Court claimed that the lack of conflict 
with the Thirteenth Amendment was "too clear for 
argument"15-a fortunate thing for the Court, for it failed to 
provide one. Relying on the Slaughter-House Cases, 16 the Court 
held that the Thirteenth Amendment was "intended primarily to 
abolish slavery, as it had been previously known in this country, 
and that it equally forbade Mexican peonage or the Chinese 
coolie trade, when they amounted to slavery or involuntary 
servitude."17 Taking its first pass at a theme that would 
permeate its opinion, the Court began to sketch a distinction 
between genuine legal harm-the stuff of slavery, for 
example-and the mere acts of social discrimination of the sort 
that Homer Plessy impudently dared to complain. It is the first of 
the Plessy Court's many invocations of the "whiny blacks" theme. 
The Court repeated the admonition of Justice Bradley in the 
Civil Rights Cases18 that "[i]t would be running the slavery 
argument into the ground to make it apply to every act of 
discrimination which a person may see fit to make as to the 
guests he will entertain, or as to the people he will take into his 
14. In the words of Juan Williams: 
There were Jim Crow schools, Jim Crow restaurants, Jim Crow water 
fountains, and Jim Crow customs-blacks were expected to tip their hats 
when they walked past whites, but whites did not have to remove their 
hats even when they entered a black family's home. Whites were to be 
called "sir" and "ma'am" by blacks, who in turn were called by their first 
names by whites. People with white skin were to be given a wide berth 
on the sidewalk; blacks were expected to step aside meekly. 
JUAN WILLIAMS, EYES ON THE PRizE: AMERICA'S CML RIGHTS YEARS, 1954-1965, at 10 
(1987). 
15. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 542 (1896). 
16. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872). 
17. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 542. 
18. 109 u.s. 3 (1883). 
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coach or cab or car, or admit to his concert or theater, or deal 
with in other matters of intercourse or business."19 
What blacks like Homer Plessy just do not understand, the 
Court was saying, is that white is white and black is black, and 
laws that say the twain shall not meet do not subject either race 
to servitude or destroy their legal equality: "A statute which 
implies merely a legal distinction between the white and colored 
races-a distinction which is founded in the color of the two races, 
and which must always exist so long as white men are 
distinguished from the other race by color-has no tendency to 
destroy the legal equality of the two races, or reestablish a state 
of involuntary servitude. "20 
Yet in its paternalistic beneficence, the Court acknowledged 
that the Thirteenth Amendment "was regarded by the statesmen 
of that day''21 as not going far enough. It would not suffice to 
merely abolish slavery and be done with the issue. Instead, the 
Fourteenth Amendment was passed "to protect the colored race 
from certain laws which had been enacted in the Southern 
States, imposing upon the colored race onerous disabilities and 
burdens, and curtailing their rights in the pursuit of life, liberty 
and property to such an extent that their freedom was of little 
value."22 Indeed, the Court pointed again to the Slaughter-House 
Cases, this time in a vein that might have held out more promise 
for Homer Plessy, observing that "the main purpose" of the 
Fourteenth Amendment was to protect African-Americans from 
"hostile legislation."23 But hard on this promising opening came 
the slamming of the front door on Plessy's face. It is perhaps the 
most famous passage from the majority opinion: 
The object of the amendment was undoubtedly to enforce 
the absolute equality of the two races before the law, but in 
the nature of things it could not have been intended to 
abolish distinctions based upon color, or to enforce social, as 
distinguished from political equality, or a commingling of the 
two races upon terms unsatisfactory to either. Laws 
permitting, and even requiring, their separation in places 
where they are liable to be brought into contact do not 
19. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 543 (quoting Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 24). 
20. Id. (emphasis added). 
21. Id. at 542. 
22. Id. 
23. Id. 
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necessarily imply the inferiority of either race to the 
other .... 24 
Warming to his theme, Justice Brown announced a distinction 
between interference with political equality, which the 
Fourteenth Amendment prohibited, and interference with social 
equality, which it did not. Some sort of distinction along these 
lines was necessary to achieve his result, for without it there 
would have been no way to distinguish the Court's prior decision 
in Strauder v. West Virginia25 and some of its embarrassing 
language. Strauder struck down a state statute excluding 
African-Americans from juries, holding that the Fourteenth 
Amendment secured to them "all the civil rights that the superior 
race [may] enjoy."26 Strauder also seemed to endorse the notion 
that laws that stigmatize African-Americans violate the 
Fourteenth Amendment, decrying legislation "implying inferiority 
in civil society, lessening the security of their enjoyment of the 
rights which others enjoy," and "which are steps towards 
reducing them to the condition of a subject race.'127 To get past 
Strauder, Justice Brown had to explain first why the law at issue 
in Plessy did not constitute any infringement of the "civil rights" 
that the "superior race may enjoy," and second, why the law was 
not an action "implying inferiority in civil society'' or impairing 
the "enjoyment of the rights which others enjoy.'' 
Justice Brown's opinion initially attacked these problems in a 
series of oblique passes. Significant ink was spilled discussing 
the Civil Rights Cases,28 testing the constitutionality of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1875.29 The Civil Rights Act of 1875 prohibited 
race discrimination in access to inns, public conveyances, and 
places of amusement.30 
The Supreme Court declared the Civil Rights Act 
unconstitutional. The Act was not supported by the Thirteenth 
Amendment,31 the Court reasoned, because that Amendment 
24. Id. at 544. 
25. 100 u.s. 303 (1879). 
26. Id. at 306. 
27. Id. at 308. 
28. 109 u.s. 3 (1883). 
29. See id. (citing 18 Stat. 335 (1875)). 
30. The Civil Rights Cases were a consolidation of five cases, all of which involved 
prosecutions against private citizens who had denied African-Americans 
accommodations in theaters or hotels. 
31. The Thirteenth Amendment reads: 
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was intended to abolish slavery and "all badges and incidents of 
slavery."32 
The Civil Rights Act, however, did not concern itself with the 
badges and incidents of slavery because equality in access to 
things such as inns and theaters could not be equated with 
slavery or its badges. ''Mere discriminations on account of race or 
color," the Court argued, "were not regarded as badges of 
slavery. "33 
The central holding of the Civil Rights Cases remains a 
cornerstone of American constitutional law: the so-called "state 
action doctrine." In defending the Civil Rights Act of 1875, the 
government claimed that Congress had authority to pass the 
legislation pursuant to the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.34 The Fourteenth Amendment, the 
Court reasoned, could not be invoked to support legislation 
barring discrimination by private actors, as opposed to 
governmental entities. The Fourteenth Amendment, the Court 
asserted, was aimed only at guaranteeing the "equal protection of 
the laws" in matters concerning the laws and actions of the state 
itself, not private individuals or businesses: 
It is State action of a particular character that is 
prohibited. Individual invasion of individual rights is not the 
subject-matter of the amendment. It has a deeper and 
broader scope. It nullifies and makes void all State 
legislation, and State action of every kind, which impairs the 
privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States, or 
which injures them in life, liberty or property without due 
Section 1. Neither slavecy nor involuntary servitude, except as a 
punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, 
shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their 
jurisdiction. 
Section 2. Congress shall have the power to enforce this article by 
appropriate legislation. 
U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. 
32. Ciuil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 20. 
33. Id. at 25. This aspect of the Ciuil Rights Cases has now been rendered 
obsolete; the Supreme Court in modern times is far more expansive in its 
understanding of the "badges and incidents" of slavecy, particularly when Congress 
invokes its power under § 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment to enforce the Amendment 
through "appropriate legislation." See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 
(1968). 
34. The Fourteenth Amendment reads: "[N]or shall any State . . . deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. 
XIV. 
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process of law, or which denies to any of them the equal 
protection of the laws. It not only does this, but ... the last 
section of the amendment invests Congress with power to 
enforce it by appropriate legislation .... To adopt appropriate 
legislation for correcting the effects of such prohibited State 
laws and State acts, and thus to render them effectually null, 
void, and innocuous. This is the legislative power conferred 
upon Congress, and this is the whole of it.35 
In making these arguments, the Court in the Civil Rights 
Cases presaged Plessy and its distinction between civic equality 
and social equality. The purpose of the Thirteenth Amendment, 
the Court argued in the Civil Rights Cases, was to guarantee 
"those fundamental rights which appertain to the essence of 
citizenship, "36 not to ensure equality in "social rights."37 
The Plessy Court's emphasis on the Civil Rights Cases, 
however, was primarily an exercise in atmospherics, for as a 
legal matter the Civil Rights Cases could not support the ruling 
in Plessy, in which a state law mandated segregation, creating 
discrimination that was plainly the product of state action. 
illtimately, to turn that trick, the Plessy Court had to meet head-
on the language in Strauder holding that laws stamping one race 
as inferior violated the Fourteenth Amendment. The solution was 
to insist that the segregation law quite simply did not imply the 
inferiority of African-Americans. If African-Americans thought it 
did, it was their problem, a problem of their own sorry 
construction and making: 
We consider the underlying fallacy of the plaintiff's 
argument to consist in the assumption that the enforced 
separation of the two races stamps the colored race with a 
badge of inferiority. If this be so, it is not by reason of 
anything found in the act, but solely because the colored race 
35. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 11. The Court in the Civil Rights Cases thus 
dealt a twin blow to the protection of the civil rights of African-Americans. It frrst 
took a narrow view of the scope of the Thirteenth Amendment, disabling that 
Amendment as an effective tool for combating discrimination. It second restricted the 
reach of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause-a clause that was 
phrased in terms far broader than the Thirteenth Amendment's abolition of 
involuntary servitude-by limiting the Fourteenth Amendment to wrongs committed 
directly by the government. "The wrongful act of an individual, unsupported by . . . 
[state] authority, is simply a private wrong, or a crime of that individual," the Court 
explained, and not a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 17. 
36. Id. at 22. 
37. Id. 
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chooses to put that construction upon it. The argument 
necessarily assumes that if, as has been more than once the 
case, and is not unlikely to be so again, the colored race 
should become the dominant power in the state legislature, 
and should enact a law in precisely similar terms, it would 
thereby relegate the white race to an inferior position. We 
imagine that the white race, at least, would not acquiesce in 
this assumption. The argument also assumes that social 
prejudices may be overcome by legislation, and that equal 
rights cannot be secured to the negro except by an enforced 
commingling of the two races. We cannot accept this 
proposition. If the two races are to meet upon terms of social 
equality, it must be the result of natural affinities, a mutual 
appreciation of each other's merits and a voluntary consent of 
individuals. . . . Legislation is powerless to eradicate racial 
instincts or to abolish distinctions based upon physical 
differences, and the attempt to do so can only result in 
accentuating the difficulties of the present situation. If the 
civil and political rights of both races be equal one cannot be 
inferior to the other civilly or politically. If one race be 
inferior to the other socially, the Constitution of the United 
States cannot put them upon the same plane.38 
There are two components to this passage. The first, and most 
brazenly false, is that the law did not stamp blacks with a badge 
of inferiority. Of course it did, and as Justice Harlan so 
eloquently argued in defense, no candid person then or now could 
maintain otherwise.39 That the law implied inferiority was all 
but admitted in a strange digression in the Court's opinion itself, 
in which the Court speculated about whether the law injured the 
reputation of persons improperly classified as members of the 
wrong race. A white called a black, the Court reasoned, might 
well have a cause of action for the damage to his "property'' in 
the good reputation of the dominant race.40 
38. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551-52 (1896). 
39. See infra notes 41-56 and accompanying text. 
40. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 549 ("It is claimed by the plaintiff in error that, in any 
mixed community, the reputation of belonging to the dominant race, in this instance 
the white race, is property, in the same sense that a right of action, or of 
inheritance, is property. Conceding this to be so, for the purposes of this case, we are 
unable to see how this statute deprives him of, or in any way affects his right to, 
such property. If he be a white man and assigned to a colored coach, he may have 
his action for damages against the company for being deprived of his so called 
property. Upon the other hand, if he be a colored man and be so assigned, he has 
been deprived of no property, since he is not lawfully entitled to the reputation of 
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The second claim of this infamous passage is that legislation is 
powerless to influence racial attitudes, and that if the races are 
not willing to meet on an equal plane, the law cannot place them 
there. This claim by the majority is the most terrifying of all 
Homer Plessy's ghosts. For one-hundred years later, we continue 
to confront the Court's disturbing claim. The ghost is awful to 
contemplate: Was the Court right? 
A century after Plessy and four decades after Brown, racial 
tension and polarization in America remain high. Is Justice 
Brown having the last laugh? To face this ghost properly we 
must first look to the Plessy majority's nemesis, Justice John 
Marshall Harlan, and his celebrated dissent. 
II. HARLAN'S DISSENT 
Justice Harlan began his analysis by discussing the legal 
status of railroads. Justice Harlan believed deeply in the sanctity 
of property,41 but for him railroads were not like any other 
private enterprise. They were instead "public highways," clothed 
with the power of eminent domain, intended for public use and 
benefit, operated "in trust for the public."42 Although we cannot 
know precisely what Justice Harlan had in mind with this 
opening line of argument, he might have seen it as serving 
several purposes. It was, on a most basic level, an oblique attack 
on the holding of the Civil Rights Cases and its narrow view of 
the state action doctrine. If railroads were public trustees, then 
when they discriminated they arguably discriminated under color 
of law, and therefore would violate the Fourteenth Amendment 
even in the absence of any explicit legislation requiring that 
discrimination. Imbuing the railroads with the status of public 
trustees also set the stage for the parade of implications Harlan 
would later make, in which he presciently asked where the 
"separate but equal" principle might stop-if people could be 
separated on railroads, then why not streets, sidewalks, open 
streetcars, courtrooms, and legislative halls?43 More than that, 
being a white man."). 
41. See Kluger, supra note 7, at 81. 
42. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 554 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
43. Id. at 557-58 ("It is one thing for railroad carriers to furnish, or to be required 
by law to furnish, equal accommodations for all whom they are under a legal duty to 
carry. It is quite another thing for government to forbid citizens of the white and 
black races from travelling in the same public conveyance, and to punish officers of 
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Harlan observed, if these discriminations were permissible as 
to race, then they would be equally permissible for other 
characteristics; Harlan thus asked, "if this statute of Louisiana is 
consistent with the personal liberty of citizens, why may not the 
State require the separation in railroad coaches of native and 
naturalized citizens of the United States, or of Protestants and 
Roman Catholics?"44 
Perhaps most importantly, Harlan's description of the railroads 
as fiduciaries for the public interest set the groundwork, early on, 
for his assault on Justice Brown's distinction between social and 
civil rights. If segregation by the railroads was segregation in the 
context of a public highway operated for public use, it arguably 
took on more of the characteristics of a "civil right," even in the 
relatively narrow sense that Justice Brown was using the term. 
And indeed, the very first sentence to follow his discussion of 
the public status of railroads stated: "In respect of civil rights, 
common to all citizens, the Constitution of the United States does 
not, I think, permit any public authority to know the race of 
those entitled to be protected in the enjoyment of such rights."45 
With this sentence, Justice Harlan introduced the first grand 
theme of his dissent, the idea that government should be color-
blind, that it is not permitted, in the words just quoted, even "to 
know the race of those entitled to be protected."46 Yet in the 
next breath, there is a qualification-a complexity. Harlan does 
not himself seem to be color-blind, nor expect others to be. He 
thus writes the peculiar statement that "[e]very true man has 
pride of race, and under appropriate circumstances when the 
rights of others, his equals before the law, are not to be affected, 
railroad companies for permitting persons of the two races to occupy the same 
passenger coach. If a State can prescribe, as a rule of civil conduct, that whites and 
blacks shall not travel as passengers in the same railroad coach, why may it not so 
regulate the use of the streets of its cities and towns as to compel white citizens to 
keep on one side of a street and black citizens to keep on the other? Why may it 
not, upon like grounds, punish whites and blacks who ride together in street cars or 
in open vehicles on a public road or street? Why may it not require sheriffs to assign 
whites to one side of a court-room and blacks to the other? And why may it not also 
prohibit the commingling of the two races in the galleries of legislative halls or in 
public assemblages convened for the consideration of the political questions of the 
day?"). 
44. Id. at 558. 
45. Id. at 554 (emphasis added). 
46. Id. (emphasis added). 
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it is his privilege to express such pride and to take such action 
based upon it as to him seems proper."47 
The juxtaposition here is both intriguing and revealing. Harlan 
seems to be accepting, in some faint degree, the "civil right" 
versus "social right" dichotomy of Justice Brown's majority 
opinion. By making the extraordinary claim that "every true 
man" has "pride of race" and under appropriate circumstances 
will "express such pride," he seems to be embracing the notion 
that people inevitably do think and act in race-conscious ways, 
and that, when contained within the private sphere in which the 
rights of others are not affected, race-conscious expression and 
action is not a bad thing. 
Harlan then writes with reverence about the Thirteenth, 
Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments, proclaiming: "These 
notable additions to the fundamental law were welcomed by the 
friends of liberty throughout the world. They removed the race 
line from our governmental systems."48 
Having thus set matters up, Justice Harlan challenged the 
majority's contention that the Louisiana law treated blacks and 
whites equally. It is important to bear in mind that the majority 
in Plessy actually approached a tentative embrace of Justice 
Harlan's premise; the Court did not say that laws passed with 
the intent of stamping a particular race with a badge of 
inferiority are constitutionally permissible-to the contrary, the 
Court's argument seemed to proceed on the assumption that such 
laws would indeed run afoul of the Fourteenth Amendment. The 
Court's argument was not that the legislature could 
constitutionally brand blacks as inferior, but rather that the 
legislature in the case before it had not engaged in any such 
branding. 49 
But this was simply disingenuous, Harlan argued; the law was 
passed to stigmatize African-Americans, Harlan argued. Proof of 
this required no investigation into legislative history, no 
painstaking parsing of the statutory language, no demonstrations 
of social science. "Every one knows" the purposes of the 
segregation laws, Harlan lectured, and that was to discriminate 
47. Id. (emphasis added). 
48. Id. at 555. 
49. See Michael J. Perry, Modern Equal Protection: A Conceptualization and 
Appraisal, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1023, 1030 (1979). 
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against blacks, and only persons "wanting in candor" would 
assert the contrary: 
Every one knows that the statute in question had its origin 
in the purpose, not so much to exclude white persons from 
railroad cars occupied by blacks, as to exclude colored people 
from coaches occupied by or assigned to white persons. 
Railroad corporations of Louisiana did not make discrimina-
tion among whites in the matter of accommodation for 
travellers. The thing to accomplish was, under the guise of 
giving equal accommodation for whites and blacks, to compel 
the latter to keep to themselves while travelling in railroad 
passenger coaches. No one would be so wanting in candor as 
to assert the contrary.50 
This was Harlan's haunting appeal to candor and conscience, 
made all the more powerful by his lack of citation to evidence or 
authority. For of course, it was true. Everyone did know the 
racist motivation underlying the law, and those who denied 
it-including Harlan's seven colleagues in the Court's 
majority-were simply lacking in candor and anesthetized in 
conscience. And in a vain but valiant effort to awaken that 
conscience, Harlan wrote the most famous paragraph in his 
nearly 34 years and 14,226 cases51 on the Supreme Court-
indeed, one of the most famous passages in the entire history of 
American law: 
The white race deems itself to be the dominant race in this 
country. And so it is, in prestige, in achievements, in 
education, in wealth and in power. So, I doubt not, it will 
continue to be for all time, if it remains true to its great 
heritage and holds fast to the principles of constitutional 
liberty. But in view of the Constitution, in the eye of the law, 
there is in this country no superior, dominant, ruling class of 
citizens. There is no caste here. Our Constitution is 
color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among 
citizens. In respect of civil rights, all citizens are equal before 
the law. The humblest is the peer of the most powerfuL The 
law regards man as man, and takes no account of his 
surroundings or of his color when his civil rights as 
guaranteed by the supreme law of the land are involved. It 
is, therefore, to be regretted that this high tribunal, the final 
50. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 557 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
51. See Kluger, supra note 7, at 81. 
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expositor of the fundamental law of the land, has reached the 
conclusion that it is competent for a State to regulate the 
enjoyment by citizens of their civil rights solely upon the 
basis of race. 52 
These magnificent words are poetic, courageous, inspiring. 
They provided the lone dissenting ghost that would haunt the 
Court until Plessy was repudiated. They stir our most 
fundamental instincts about the promise of American life. They 
are all of that. But they are not color-blind. 
Justice Harlan did not argue that we as a people do not know 
color. He argued only that the law does not know it. Conjuring a 
ghost of his own, that of the slave Dred Scott, Harlan asserted 
that the destinies of blacks and whites in America are 
indissolubly linked together, and that laws sanctioning 
separation could only sow seeds of race-hate: 
In my opinion, the judgment this day rendered will, in 
time, prove to be quite as pernicious as the decision made by 
this tribunal in the Dred Scott case. It was adjudged in that 
case that the descendants of Africans who were imported into 
this country and sold as slaves were not included nor 
intended to be included under the word "citizens" in the 
Constitution, and could not claim any of the rights and 
privileges which that instrument provided for and secured to 
citizens of the United States; that at the time of the adoption 
of the Constitution they were "considered as a subordinate 
and inferior class of beings, who had been subjugated by the 
dominant race~ and, whether emancipated or not, yet 
remained subject to their authority, and had no rights or 
privileges but such as those who held the power and the 
government might choose to grant them." The recent 
amendments of the Constitution, it was supposed, had 
eradicated these principles from our institutions. But it 
seems that we have yet, in some of the States, a dominant 
race--a superior class of citizens, which assumes to regulate 
the enjoyment of civil rights, common to all citizens, upon the 
basis of race. The present decision, it may well be 
apprehended, will not only stimulate aggressions, more or 
less brutal and irritating, upon the admitted rights of colored 
citizens, but will encourage the belief that it is possible, by 
means of state enactments, to defeat the beneficent purposes 
52. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
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which the people of the United States had in view when they 
adopted the recent amendments of the Constitution, by one of 
which the blacks of this country were made citizens of the 
United States and of the States in which they respectively 
reside, and whose privileges and immunities, as citizens, the 
States are forbidden to abridge. Sixty millions of whites are 
in no danger from the presence here of eight millions of 
blacks. The destinies of the two races, in this country, are 
indissolubly linked together, and the interests of both require 
that the common government of all shall not permit the seeds 
of race hate to be planted under the sanction of law. What 
can more certainly arouse race hate, what more certainly 
create and perpetuate a feeling of distrust between these 
races, than state enactments, which, in fact, proceed on the 
ground that colored citizens are so inferior and degraded that 
they cannot be allowed to sit in public coaches occupied by 
white citizens? That, as all will admit, is the real meaning of 
such legislation as was enacted in Louisiana. 53 
Again, note Harlan's appeal to self-evident candor. These laws, 
he states bluntly, in fact proceed on the assumption that African-
Americans are inferior and degraded, something that all will 
admit. Something, in fact, that his seven Brethren and most of 
the nation denied. 
At many times the tone of Harlan's opinion is both prophetic 
and apocalyptic. In discussing the many devices of separating the 
races in jury rooms and public meeting places that the ruling in 
Plessy would countenance, Harlan presciently anticipates the 
many indignities of Jim Crow. The bleak side of the human 
imagination has an almost inexhaustible capacity for ingenious 
variations on the theme of degradation. The abolition of slavery 
would have been accomplished, Harlan admonished, but its evil 
racist roots would remain alive: 
If laws of like character should be enacted in the several 
States of the Union, the effect would be in the highest degree 
mischievous. Slavery, as an institution tolerated by law 
would, it is true, have disappeared from our country, but 
there would remain a power in the States, by sinister 
legislation, to interfere with the full enjoyment of the 
blessings of freedom; to regulate civil rights, common to all 
citizens, upon the basis of race; and to place in a condition of 
53. Id. at 559·60 (citation omitted). 
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legal inferiority a large body of American citizens, now 
constituting a part of the political community called the 
People ofthe United States .... 54 
Like Ghandi and Martin Luther King, Jr., after him, Harlan 
held the blight of injustice in his own country up to the 
conscience of international opinion: 
We boast of the freedom enjoyed by our people above all other 
peoples. But it is difficult to reconcile that boast with a state 
of the law which, practically, puts the brand of servitude and 
degradation upon a large class of our fellow-citizens, our 
equals before the law. The thin disguise of "equal" 
accommodations for passengers in railroad coaches will not 
mislead any one, nor atone for the wrong this day done. 55 
Yes, Justice Harlan was a prophet, a courageous and inspiring 
one. But what, precisely, was his prophecy? Above all else, the 
opinion is most cited and most remembered for one sentence: 
"Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates 
classes among citizens. "56 
III. THE EVOLVING NEAR-COLOR-BLINDNESS OF THE MODERN COURT 
A The Recent Voting Rights Cases 
Today, of course, our Constitution and laws are not color-blind. 
Civil rights laws from the Voting Rights Act to affirmative action 
programs of all kinds are race-conscious. The Supreme Court 
today permits the government to both ''know" and "tolerate" 
racial classifications. Is this the most persistent ghost of Homer 
Plessy-the ghost of race-consciousness? Are we still paying the 
price for not heeding the call of the prophet Harlan? 
One line of argument is that we remain a nation divided on 
racial grounds because we remain a nation officially conscious of 
race. The true antidote for the majority's views in Plessy, the 
argument goes, is the antidote supplied by the lone dissenter in 
the case. Until the nation finally embraces Harlan's ideal, 
abolishing race-conscious policies from affirmative action to the 
Voting Rights Act, we will never know peace, and the ghosts of 
Homer Plessy will continue to harass us. 
54. Id. at 563-64. 
55. Id. at 562. 
56. Id. at 559 (emphasis added). 
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This argument appears to be gaining ground in the Supreme 
Court, where a growing number of Justices appear to be 
increasingly hostile to any use of race in governmental 
classifications. The voting rights decisions of recent terms provide 
the most vivid examples of this trend. 
1. Shaw v. Reno 
In Shaw v. Reno,51 for example, the Court expressed deep-
seated suspicion of race-conscious redistricting. The dispute in 
Shaw arose when the State of North Carolina became entitled to 
an additional twelfth seat in the United States House of 
Representatives as a result of the 1990 census. The North 
Carolina General Assembly enacted a reapportionment plan that 
included one congressional district containing a majority of 
African-American residents. Preclearance review is required for 
the "covered jurisdictions" under the provisions of section 5 of the 
Voting Rights Act.58 The Attorney General refused to accept the 
General Assembly's plan, taking the position that the legislature 
could have created a second district with a majority of minority 
voters.59 In response, the General Assembly passed new 
legislation creating a second congressional district with a 
majority African-American population.60 It was not, however, 
located in the southeastern part of North Carolina, as 
recommended by the Attorney General, but rather in the 
north-central region of North Carolina, along a corridor formed 
by Interstate Highway 85.61 This plan was challenged by a 
group of North Carolinians who alleged that the revised 
57. 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993). 
58. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1993). Under § 5, the jurisdiction must obtain either a 
judgment from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia declaring 
that the proposed change "does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of 
denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color" or administrative 
preclearance from the Attorney General. Id. In North Carolina's case, some 40 of the 
state's 100 counties are covered by § 5, and thus are prohibited by law from 
implementing changes in a "standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting" 
without federal authorization. 
59. See Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2820. The Attorney General took the position that the 
General Assembly should have created a second district that would have given 
greater effect to black and Native American voting strength in the southeastern area 
of the state. The Attorney General asserted that the state failed to create such a 
second district for pretextual reasons. Id. 
60. Id. (citing 1991 N.C. Extra Sess. Laws, ch. 7). 
61. See id. 
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reapportionment scheme was an unconstitutional gerrymander 
because it included voting district boundary lines of dramatically 
irregular shape. 62 
As the Supreme Court described the new plan in Shaw, 
"District 1," the first of the two majority-black districts contained 
in the revised plan, "is somewhat hook shaped."63 The Court 
explained: "Centered in the northeast portion of the State, 
[District 1] moves southward until it tapers to a narrow band; 
then, with finger-like extensions, it reaches far into the 
southern-most part of the State near the South Carolina 
border."64 District 1, the Court noted, "has been compared to a 
'Rorschach ink-blot test' "65 and a "'bug splattered on a 
windshield.' "66 
It was "District 12," however, the second majority-black district 
created in North Carolina's revised plan, that drew the more 
notorious descriptions. As the Court in Shaw described it, 
District 12 is "even more unusually shaped."67 District 12 "is 
approximately 160 miles long and, for much of its length, no 
wider than the I-85 corridor. It winds in snake-like fashion 
through tobacco country, financial centers, and manufacturing 
areas 'until it gobbles in enough enclaves of black neighbor-
hoods.' "68 District 12's shape, indeed, was all too easily 
62. See id. at 2820-21. To set this claim in context, it is important to understand 
the basic geography and demographics of North Carolina. North Carolina's geography 
consists of an eastern Coastal Plain, a central Piedmont Plateau, and a mountainous 
western region. ld. at 2820 (citing HUGH T. LEFLER & ALBERT R. NEWSOM, THE 
HISTORY OF A SOUTHERN STATE: NORTH CAROLINA 18-22 (3d ed. 1973)). The voting-
age population of North Carolina is approximately 78% white, 20% African-American, 
1% Native-American, and 1% other ethnic groups. ld. Persons in the "other" group 
category are predominately Asian and Asian-American. ld. The African-American 
population is somewhat dispersed in the state. African-Americans are a majority of 
the general population in only 5 of the state's 100 counties. The largest 
concentrations of African-Americans are in the Coastal Plain area, particularly in the 
northern sections of the plain. ld. (citing OLE GADE & H. DANIEL STILLWELL, NORTH 
CAROLINA: PEOPLE AND ENVIRONMENTS 65-68 (1986)). 
Given these demographic patterns, it was quite natural that the North Carolina 
General Assembly's original redistricting plan contained one district centered in the 
northern part of the eastern Coastal Plain area that had a majority African-American 
population. The great debate arose over the attempt to create the second 
predominately African-American district. 
63. ld. 
64. Id. 
65. Id. (quoting Shaw v. Barr, 808 F. Supp. 461, 476 (E.D.N.C. 1992) (Voorhees, 
C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). 
66. ld. (quoting WALL ST. J., Feb. 4, 1992, at A14). 
67. Id. 
68. ld. at 2820-21 (quoting Shaw v. Barr, 808 F. Supp. 461, 476-77 (E.D.N.C. 1992) 
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amenable to parody. The Court in Shaw noted that northbound 
and southbound drivers on Interstate 85 sometimes found 
themselves in separate districts in one county, only to "trade" 
districts when they entered the next county.69 Towns were 
divided into different districts, five counties were cut into three 
different districts, and at one point the district was kept 
contiguous "only because it intersect[ed] at a single point with 
two other districts before crossing over them."70 The Court in 
Shaw quoted the quip of a North Carolina state legislator, who 
sniped that " '[i]f you drove down the interstate with both car 
doors open, you'd kill most of the people in the district.' "71 
The Supreme Court's opinion in Shaw was written by Justice 
Sandra Day O'Connor. The central theme of the Court's opinion 
was that the North Carolina reapportionment plan too closely 
resembled the types of invidious racial gerrymandering that the 
Court had long condemned under the Equal Protection Clause. 
The Court described at length the evils of race discrimination in 
the design of voting districts, discrimination that had historically 
been used to dilute or disenfranchise African-American voters. 
While North Carolina's plan was not designed to hurt African-
Americans, but to help them, a majority of the Justices on the 
Court clearly felt disturbed, at a very visceral level, at how 
openly and blatantly the awkwardly shaped North Carolina 
Districts 1 and 12 used race as their defining characteristic. 
Thus, Justice O'Connor's opinion for the Court stated that the 
challenge to North Carolina's plan struck "a powerful historical 
chord"72 and remarked that it was "unsettling how closely the 
North Carolina plan resembles the most egregious racial 
gerrymanders of the past."73 
The Court began its analysis by acknowledging that the 
Constitution is not color-blind. Race-conscious remedies are 
permitted under the Equal Protection Clause; and indeed, race-
(Voorhees, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). 
69. Id. at 2821. 
70. Id. 
71. Id. (internal quotations omitted) (quoting WASH. POST, Apr. 20, 1993, at A4). 
The Court further noted that District 12 has even inspired poetry: "Ask not for whom 
the line is drawn; it is drawn to avoid thee." Bernard Grofman, Would Vince 
Lombardi Have Been Right If He Had Said: "When it Comes to Redistricting, Race 
Isn't Everything, It's the Only Thing?", 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1237, 1261 n.96 (1993); 
see Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2821. 
72. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2824. 
73. Id. 
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conscious redistricting is sometimes constitutional. 74 The 
problem, as the Court saw it, was how to place limits on this 
principle. Does the Constitution permit redistricting plans that 
create districts so extremely irregular on their face that they may 
rationally be viewed only as an effort to segregate the races for 
purposes of voting, without regard for traditional districting 
principles and without sufficiently compelling justification? The 
Court concluded that the answer to this question is no. 
The central purpose of the Equal Protection Clause, the Court 
argued, "is to prevent the States from purposefully discriminat-
ing between individuals on the basis of race."75 Drawing on its 
affirmative action jurisprudence, 76 the Court held that all overt 
racial classifications must be subjected to strict judicial 
scrutiny;77 the Equal Protection Clause, the Court insisted, does 
not embody a lower standard of judicial review for the ''benign" 
use of racial classifications. 78 Drawing on her own prior opinion 
in Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,19 Justice O'Connor observed 
that "[e]xpress racial classifications are immediately suspect 
because, '[a]bsent searching judicial inquiry ... , there is simply 
no way of determining what classifications are ''benign" or 
"remedial" and what classifications are in fact motivated by 
illegitimate notions of racial inferiority or simple racial 
politics.' "80 
74. See id. ("This Court never has held that race·conscious state decisionmaking is 
impermissible in all circumstances."). 
75. Id. (citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976)); see Personnel Adm'r 
of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979); see also Washington v. Seattle Sch. 
Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 485 (1982). 
76. See supra text accompanying notes 109-67. 
77. See Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2825 ("Accordingly, we have held that the Fourteenth 
Amendment requires state legislation that expressly distinguishes among citizens 
because of their race to be narrowly tailored to further a compelling governmental 
interest."); see also Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 277-78 (1986) 
(plurality opinion). 
78. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2824. 
79. 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion). 
80. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2824 (quoting Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 
493 (1989) (plurality opinion)). Justice O'Connor's opinion in Shaw also quoted a prior 
statement by Justice Brennan that "a purportedly preferential race assignment may 
in fact disguise a policy that perpetuates disadvantageous treatment of the plan's 
supposed beneficiaries." United Jewish Org. of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 
144, 172 (1977) (Brennan, J., concurring in part); see Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2824. 
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2. Miller v. Johnson 
More recently, in Miller v. Johnson, 81 the Supreme Court 
examined a congressional redistricting plan for the State of 
Georgia under the principles announced in Shaw. Justice 
Anthony Kennedy's opinion for the Supreme Court in Miller 
described the critical Eleventh District in Georgia in highly 
unflattering terms: 
The Eleventh District lost the black population of Macon, but 
picked up Savannah, thereby connecting the black 
neighborhoods of metropolitan Atlanta and the poor black 
populace of coastal Chatham County, though 260 miles apart 
in distance and worlds apart in culture. In short, the social, 
political and economic makeup of the Eleventh District tells a 
tale of disparity, not community.82 
Elections were held pursuant to the new plan in 1992, and three 
black members of Congress were elected from the three majority-
black districts. Five white voters from the Eleventh District sued 
to challenge the redistricting plan, alleging that the district was 
an unconstitutional gerrymander under the principles of Shaw v. 
81. 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995). Since 1965 Georgia had been a "covered jurisdiction" for 
purposes of the Voting Rights Act, requiring preclearance review under § 5 of the Act 
of any change in a standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting. Between 
1980 and 1990, one of Georgia's ten congressional districts contained a majority of 
black voters. The 1990 Decennial Census indicated that Georgia's population had 
grown sufficiently to entitle it to an additional eleventh congressional seat. The 
Georgia General Assembly first drew up a plan that included two majority-black 
districts, the Fifth and the Eleventh, plus an additional district, the Second, that 
contained a 35% black population. The Department of Justice, however, rejected the 
plan on preclearance review. The General Assembly tried again. Its second effort 
increased the black populations of the three districts, but again resulted in only two 
majority-black districts. The Justice Department also rejected this plan. On its third 
attempt, the General Assembly created three majority-black districts, following largely 
the so-called "max-black" plan drawn by the American Civil Liberties Union for the 
General Assembly's black caucus. The key to this plan was the "Macon!Savannall 
trade." The dense black population in the Macon region of Georgia was transferred 
from the Eleventh District to the Second, converting the Second into a majority-black 
district, and the Eleventh District's loss in black population was offset by extending 
the Eleventh to include the black populations in the coastal city of Savannah. Id. at 
2483-84. 
82. Id. at 2484. Quoting from a reference work on American politics, the Court 
further observed: " 'Geographically, it is a monstrosity, stretching from Atlanta to 
Savannah. Its core is the plantation country in the center of the state, lightly 
populated, but heavily black. It links by narrow corridors the black neighborhoods in 
Augusta, Savannah and southern DeKalb County.' " Id. (quoting MICHAEL BARONE & 
GRANT UJIFUSA, ALMANAC OF AMERICAN POLITICS 356 (1994)). 
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Reno. The district court struck down the plan, holding that race 
was the "overriding, predominant force" animating its enactment, 
citing the irregular shape of the district, including appendages 
drawn for the obvious purpose of capturing additional black 
populations. 83 
In the Supreme Court, the Justice Department and State of 
Georgia did not defend the redistricting plan by disputing that 
racial motivation was a dominant purpose. Rather, the plan was 
defended on the theory that under Shaw a plaintiff must 
demonstrate that a district's shape is so bizarre that it is 
unexplainable other than on the basis of race. 84 Justice 
Kennedy's majority opinion rejected this view, stating that it 
erroneously characterized the holding in Shaw.85 The equal 
protection violation in Shaw, the Court explained, was 
"analytically distinct"86 from vote dilution claims. The Court 
then placed the use of race in drawing congressional districts on 
a par with the types of invidious discrimination that had been 
struck down in the various cases from the 1950s emanating from 
Brown v. Board of Education, 87 stating that "[j]ust as the State 
may not, absent extraordinary justification, segregate citizens on 
the basis of race in its public parks, buses, golf courses, beaches, 
and schools, so did we recognize in Shaw that it may not 
separate its citizens into different voting districts on the basis of 
race."88 The Court claimed that "[t]he idea is a simple one: At 
the heart of the Constitution's guarantee of equal protection lies 
the simple command that the Government must treat citizens as 
individuals, not as simply components of a racial, religious, 
sexual or national class."89 Picking up on a theme prominent in 
both Shaw and the dissenting opinions in the Court's now-
83. Johnson v. Miller, 864 F. Supp. 1354, 1372, 1378 (S.D. Ga. 1994). 
84. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2485. 
85. Id. 
86. Id. 
87. 347 u.s. 483 (1954). 
88. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2486 (citing New Orleans City Park Improvement Ass'n v. 
Detiege, 358 U.S. 54 (1958) (per curiam) (parks); Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 
(1956) (per curiam) (buses); Holmes v. Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955) (per curiam) (golf 
courses); Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955) (per 
curiam) (beaches); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (schools)). 
89. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. 
FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 602 (1990) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Arizona Governing 
Comm'n for Tax Deferred Annuity and Deferred Compensation Plans v. Norris, 463 
u.s. 1073, 1083 (1983))). 
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overruled affirmative action decision in Metro Broadcasting,90 
the Court asserted that "[ w ]hen the State assigns voters on the 
basis of race, it engages in the offensive and demeaning 
assumption that voters of a particular race, because of their race, 
'think alike, share the same political interests, and will prefer 
the same candidates at the polls.' "91 The Court then explained 
that ''bizarreness" was not a constitutional requirement, but 
mere evidence of an underlying constitutional violation.92 
Elaborating on this theme, the Court further rejected the 
argument "that the Equal Protection Clause's general 
proscription on race-based decisionmaking does not obtain in the 
districting context because redistricting by definition involves 
racial considerations," holding that this argument indulged "the 
very stereotypical assumptions [that] the Equal Protection Clause 
forbids"-namely, "that individuals of the same race share a 
single political interest."93 Nevertheless, the Court drew a 
distinction between a legislature's awareness of race in drawing 
district lines, and situations in which race predominates in the 
redistricting process.94 Thus, the Fourteenth Amendment will 
not be offended when lines are drawn "in spite of' rather than 
''because of'' their racial consequences.95 Applying this standard, 
90. 497 u.s. 547 (1990). 
91. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2486 (quoting Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2827 
(1993)). 
92. Id. 
Our observation in Shaw of the consequences of racial stereotyping 
was not meant to suggest that a district must be bizarre on its face 
before there is a constitutional violation. Nor was our conclusion in Shaw 
that in certain instances a district's appearance (or, to be more precise, 
its appearance in combination with certain demographic evidence) can 
give rise to an equal protection claim, a holding that bizarreness was a 
threshold showing, as appellants believe it to be. Our circumspect 
approach and narrow holding in Shaw did not erect an artificial rule 
barring accepted equal protection analysis in other redistricting cases. 
Shape is relevant not because bizarreness is a necessary element of the 
constitutional wrong or a threshold requirement of proof, but because it 
may be persuasive circumstantial evidence that race for its own sake, 
and not other districting principles, was the legislature's dominant and 
controlling rationale in drawing its district lines. The logical implication, 
as courts applying Shaw have recognized, is that parties may rely on 
evidence other than bizarreness to establish race-based districting. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
93. Id. at 2487. 
94. Id. at 2488. 
95. Id. (quoting Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979)). 
" '[D)iscriminatory purpose' . . . implies more than intent as volition or intent as 
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the Court agreed with the district court below that race was the 
predominant, overriding factor in the Georgia General Assembly's 
redistricting plan, and thus applied strict scrutiny to the plan. 96 
The critical question then became whether Georgia could 
successfully defend itself under the strict scrutiny test by 
asserting that it had a compelling governmental interest in 
complying with the requirements of the Voting Rights Act. 
The Court did not unequivocally state in Miller that 
compliance with the Voting Rights Act, standing alone, would 
ever automatically satisfy the strict scrutiny test, stating instead 
that "[ w ]hether or not in some cases compliance with the Voting 
Rights Act, standing alone, can provide a compelling interest 
independent of any interest in remedying past discrimination, it 
cannot do so here."97 Reiterating what it had said in Shaw, the 
Court in Miller emphasized that compliance with federal 
antidiscrimination laws cannot justify race-based districting 
when the challenged district "was not reasonably necessary 
under a constitutional reading and application of those laws."98 
In a rebuke to the Justice Department, the Court then held that 
the first two redistricting plans submitted by Georgia were not in 
violation of the Voting Rights Act. Those plans, which increased 
the number of majority-minority districts from one to two, were 
"ameliorative," and thus did not violate the nonretrogression 
principle of section 5 of the Act.99 Nor was there any evidence in 
awareness of consequences. It implies that the decisionmaker . . . selected or 
reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part 'because of,' not merely 'in 
spite of,' its adverse effects." Id. (footnotes and citation omitted). The Court then 
summarized the plaintiffs burden in Shaw challenges to districting plans: 
The plaintiffs burden is to show, either through circumstantial evidence 
of a district's shape and demographics or more direct evidence going to 
legislative purpose, that race was the predominant factor motivating the 
legislature's decision to place a significant number of voters \vithin or 
without a particular district. To make this showing, a plaintiff must 
prove that the legislature subordinated traditional race-neutral districting 
principles, including but not limited to compactness, contiguity, respect 
for political subdivisions or communities defined by actual shared 
interests, to racial considerations. Where these or other race-neutral 
considerations are the basis for redistricting legislation, and are not 
subordinated to race, a state can "defeat a claim that a district has been 
gerrymandered on racial lines." 
Id. (quoting Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2827 (1993)). 
96. Id. at 2490. 
97. Id. at 2490-91. 
98. Id. at 2491. 
99. Id. at 2492. 
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the record that Georgia's initial two plans were motivated by any 
discriminatory intent.100 Thus, the Court reasoned, the Justice 
Department's refusal to accept Georgia's earlier plans was based 
on the Department's own misapplication of the Voting Rights Act; 
the Justice Department's further insistence that Georgia adopt a 
plan that increased the number of majority-minority districts to 
three was an "implicit command that States engage in 
presumptively unconstitutional race-based districting."101 
Seeming to rub salt in the Department's wounds, the Court then 
suggested that such far-reaching and unconstitutional 
interpretations of the Voting Rights Act could bring into question 
the very constitutional legitimacy of the Act itself, observing that 
if Congress actually intended such a construction of the Act-a 
proposition the Court seemed to doubt-then the Act could well 
exceed Congress's enforcement authority under the Fifteenth 
Amendment.102 
Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer dissented. Justice 
Ginsburg's dissent examined the history of federal court 
intervention into the "political thicket" of apportionment, arguing 
that federal court intervention had often been required because 
the political system was scarcely open to self-correction. 103 
Turning to the merits of the Georgia plan, Justice Ginsburg 
disagreed with the Court's conclusion that race "overwhelmed" 
the Georgia legislature's traditional districting practices, in the 
same sense that race had appeared to overwhelm all other 
factors in Shaw. 104 Georgia's Eleventh District, she observed, 
was not bizarre, extremely irregular, or irrational on its face. 105 
She noted further that in the Georgia legislature nonracial 
factors had clearly played an important role, including the 
accommodation of "an incumbent State Senator regarding the 
placement of the precinct in which his son lived."106 Most 
significantly, she took eloquent issue with the majority's failure 
to recognize the unique circumstances that justify special judicial 
protection of minority voters: 
100. !d. 
101. !d. at 2493. 
102. !d. 
103. !d. at 2500 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
104. !d. at 2502. 
105. !d. 
106. !d. at 2503. 
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Special circumstances justify vigilant judicial inspection to 
protect minority voters-circumstances that do not apply to 
majority voters. A history of exclusion from state politics left 
racial minorities without clout to extract provisions for fair 
representation in the lawmaking forum. The equal protection 
rights of minority voters thus could have remained 
unrealized absent the Judiciary's close surveillance. The 
majority, by definition, encounters no such blockage. White 
voters in Georgia do not lack means to exert strong pressure 
on their state legislators. The force of their numbers is itself 
a powerful determiner of what the legislature will do that 
does not coincide with perceived majority interests.107 
Justice Ginsburg concluded that the result of Miller and Shaw 
would be to put all redistricting plans at risk; only after 
litigation, she observed, "will States now be assured that plans 
conscious of race are safe."108 
B. Affirmative Action and the Fragile Position of "Diversity" 
The ghosts of Homer Plessy are also visible in the Supreme 
Court's recent treatment of affirmative action.109 From the 
Court's very earliest affirmative action decisions, a majority of 
Justices signaled an unwillingness to interpret either the 
Fourteenth Amendment or civil rights statutes as imposing a 
standard of absolute color-blindness that would bar all race-
conscious remedial programs by government. A majority of the 
Court in early decisions such as Regents of the University of 
107. Id. at 2506 (citing United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 
n.4 (1938)). 
108. Id. at 2507 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
109. See generally John Hart Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial 
Discrimination, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 723 (1974); Richard A. Posner, The Bakke Case 
and the Future of "Affirmative Action," 67 CAL. L. REV. 171 (1979); Terrance 
Sandalow, Racial Preferences in Higher Education: Political Responsibility and the 
Judicial Role, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 653 (1975); Laurence M. Tribe, Perspectives on 
Bakke: Equal Protection, Procedural Fairness, or Structural Justice?, 92 HARv. L. REV. 
864 (1979); William Van Alstyne, Rites of Passage: Race, the Supreme Court, and the 
Constitution, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 775 (1979). 
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California v. Bakke110 and Fullilove v. Klutznick, m for 
example, squarely rejected Justice Harlan's claim in Plessy that 
the Constitution is color-blind.112 The Court's more recent 
110. 438 U.S. 265 (1978). The "reverse-discrimination" question had reached the 
Court prior to Bakke in DeFunis u. Odegaard, a case in which a white male 
challenged a minority-admissions program at the University of Washington School of 
Law. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974). The special-admissions program 
reserved a portion of the law school class for blacks, Chicanos, American Indians, and 
Filipinos. The Court did not reach the merits, holding in a 5-4 decision that the case 
was moot because DeFunis was registered for the final term of his third year of law 
school by the time the case was argued in the Supreme Court. Justice Douglas, 
dissenting on the mootness issue, reached the merits. He wrote that the program was 
unconstitutional, stating that the law school must treat each applicant "in a racially 
neutral way." Id. at 334 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Justice Douglas adopted a 
color-blind equal protection standard, writing that "[i]f discrimination based on race is 
constitutionally permissible when those who hold the reins can come up with 
'compelling' reasons to justify it, then constitutional guarantees acquire an 
accordionlike quality." Id. at 343 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
111. 448 u.s. 448 (1980). 
112. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting). In Regents 
of the Uniu. of Cal. u. Bakke, the petitioner, Alan Bakke, challenged the validity of a 
special admissions program for minority students at the medical school of the 
University of California at Davis. Four members of the Court, Justices Brennan, 
White, Marshall, and Blackmun, voted to uphold the special-admissions program, 
stating that the "[g]overnment may take race into account when it acts not to 
demean or insult any racial group, but to remedy disadvantages cast on minorities by 
past racial prejudice." Bakke, 438 U.S. at 325 (Brennan, White, Marshall, & 
Blackmun, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Powell, who cast 
the critical swing vote in Bakke, agreed with these Justices that government may in 
some circumstances use race as a selective criterion. He held, however, that the 
particular race-conscious program used by the Davis Medical School was 
constitutionally impermissible because it tended to pursue racial preference for its 
own sake, rather than for valid educational reasons. Id. at 307-20 (Powell, J.). The 
remaining four Justices never reached the constitutional issue, holding that the Davis 
program violated Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976), which they construed to be color-blind. See id. at 408-21 
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by Burger, C.J., 
Stewart, & Rehnquist, JJ.). Thus, the peculiar judicial compromise in Bakke approved 
in principle the government's use of race as a selective criterion, but struck down the 
particular racially selective program before the Court. 
Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke is particularly important, for his views largely 
created the blueprint for the Court's next two decades of affirmative action 
jurisprudence. Powell's opinion is a riveting example of a great Supreme Court 
Justice struggling to accommodate the competing tugs and pulls of process and 
equality thinking. The compromise he reached permitted the use of race as a factor 
in admissions to achieve the outcome of a more diverse student body, but only 
because "diversity" was perceived by Justice Powell as a goal distinguishable from the 
pursuit of an ideal racial balance for its own sake. And Justice Powell in Bakke held 
that even if the outcome-oriented goal of pursing education diversity is a permissible 
goal under the Constitution, it may be pursued only through a process that is 
individualistic in its application. The cruder "group rights" style remedy of setting 
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pronouncements on affirmative action, however, seem to have 
come closer to a color-blind position. 
1. Adarand Constuctors, Inc. v. Pefia 
In Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 113 the Supreme Court 
narrowed the scope of constitutionally permitted affirmative 
action. The case involved the constitutional propriety of clauses 
typically found in the contracts of most federal agencies, which 
by law must contain a subcontractor compensation clause giving 
a prime contractor a financial incentive to hire subcontractors 
certified as small businesses controlled by socially and 
economically disadvantaged individuals, and requmng the 
contractor to presume that such individuals include minorities or 
any other individuals found to be disadvantaged by the Small 
aside a limited quota of seats for minority members only was simply too brazenly 
outcome-centered for Justice Powell to tolerate. Thus Powell approved of the 
government's pursuit of pluralism in education, writing that "the attainment of a 
diverse student body . . . clearly is a constitutionally permissible goal for an 
institution of higher education." Id. at 311-12 (Powell, J.). Powell proceeded, however, 
to focus on the distinction between educational pluralism and racial balance for its 
own sake. That distinction is the crucial point in his opinion and thus in the 
judgment of the Bakke Court. Powell stated that the Davis Medical School's pursuit 
of ethnic pluralism was permissible only as "one element in a range of factors a 
university properly may consider in attaining the goal of a heterogeneous student 
body." Id. at 314. By contrast, ethnic pluralism pursued for its own sake is neither a 
compelling state interest, nor a constitutionally permissible goal: "[p]referring 
members of any one group for no reason other than race or ethnic origin is 
discrimination for its own sake. This the Constitution forbids." Id. at 307. Describing 
race as one in a wide range of factors that should be considered in the interest of 
academic pluralism-a factor incident to developing a student body capable of 
enjoying a robust exchange of ideas and perspectives-Powell rejected the argument 
that the permissible educational pursuit of diversity requires reserving a specified 
number of spaces for a given racial group. On the contrary, Powell argued that a 
specific racial quota hinders the attainment of true diversity. In rejecting the idea of 
specific quotas, Justice Powell wrote: 
[T]he argument misconceives the nature of the state interest that would 
justify consideration of race or ethnic background. It is not an interest in 
simple ethnic diversity, in which a specified percentage of the student 
body is in effect guaranteed to be members of selected ethnic groups, 
with the remaining percentage an undifferentiated aggregation of 
students. The diversity that furthers a compelling state interest 
encompasses a far broader array of qualifications and characteristics of 
which racial or ethnic origin is but a single though important element. 
Petitioner's special admission program, focused solely on ethnic diversity, 
would hinder rather than further attainment of genuine diversity. 
Id. at 315. 
113. 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995). 
1996] THE GHOSTS OF HOMER PLESSY 1065 
Business Administration.114 The precise dispute arose from 
highway construction undertaken by the United States 
Department of Transportation in Colorado. The prime contractor 
was Mountain Gravel & Construction Company, which solicited 
bids for certain guardrail subcontract work. Adarand 
Constructors, Inc., a Colorado-based highway construction firm, 
submitted the low bid. Gonzales Construction Company, a 
company certified as controlled by "socially and economically 
disadvantaged individuals," submitted a higher bid, but was 
awarded the contract. Under the terms of the prime contract, 
Mountain Gravel would receive additional compensation if it 
hired such a designated disadvantaged business. 115 Pursuant to 
114. Id. at 2102. The Small Business Act (SBA), 72 Stat. 384, as amended, 15 
U.S.C. §§ 631-647 (1976), declares it to be "the policy of the United States that small 
business concerns, [and] small business concerns owned and controlled by socially and 
economically disadvantaged individuals, . . . shall have the maximum practicable 
opportunity to participate in the performance of contracts let by any Federal agency." 
Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 637(d)(l) (1976)). The Act defines "socially disadvantaged 
individuals" as "those who have been subjected to racial or ethnic prejudice or 
cultural bias because of their identity as a member of a group without regard to 
their individual qualities," id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 637(a)(5) (1976)), and it defines 
"economically disadvantaged individuals" as "those socially disadvantaged individuals 
whose ability to compete in the free enterprise system has been impaired due to 
diminished capital and credit opportunities as compared to others in the same 
business area who are not socially disadvantaged." Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. 
§ 637(a)(6)(A) (1976)). In furtherance of the stated policy, the Act establishes "[t]he 
Government-wide goal for participation by small business concerns owned and 
controlled by socially and economically disadvantaged individuals" at "not less than 5 
percent of the total value of all prime contract and subcontract awards for each fiscal 
year." ld. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 644(g)(l) (1976)). "It also requires the head of each 
Federal agency to set agency-specific goals for participation by businesses controlled 
by socially and economically disadvantaged individuals." Id. 
115. Under the SBA's "8(a) program," which is available to small businesses 
controlled by socially and economically disadvantaged individuals as the SBA has 
defined those terms, a wide range of benefits are conferred on participating 
businesses. ld.; see 13 C.F.R. §§ 124.303-.311, -.403 (1994); 48 C.F.R. subpt. 19.8 
(1994). One such benefit is automatic eligibility for subcontractor compensation 
provisions. Adarand Constructors, 15 S. Ct. at 2102-03 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 637(d)(3)(C) 
(1976) (conferring presumptive eligibility on anyone "found to be disadvantaged ... 
pursuant to section 8(a) of the Small Business Act")). 
To participate in the 8(a) program, a business must be "small," as 
defmed in 13 CFR § 124.102 (1994); and it must be 51% owned by 
individuals who qualify as "socially and economically disadvantaged," 
§ 124.103. The SBA presumes that Black, Hispanic, Asian Pacific, 
Subcontinent Asian, and Native Americans, as well as "members of other 
groups designated from time to time by SBA," are "socially 
disadvantaged," § 124.105(b)(l). It also allows any individual not a 
member of a listed group to prove social disadvantage "on the basis of 
clear and convincing evidence," as described in § 124.105(c). Social 
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a Department of Transportation appropriations measure, "not 
less than 10 percent" of the appropriated funds were to be 
expended on certified disadvantaged businesses. 116 When 
Adarand lost the subcontract bid to Gonzalez, Adarand sued in 
federal court to challenge the constitutionality of the affirmative 
action scheme; the lower courts found for the government, 
upholding the affirmative action programs.117 
The Supreme Court began by noting that while the programs 
at issue spoke in terms of "disadvantaged," a race-neutral 
concept, the race-based rebuttable presumption used in the 
disadvantage is not enough to establish eligibility, however; SBA also 
requires each 8(a) program participant to prove "economic disadvantage" 
according to the criteria set forth in § 124.106(a). 
[Another SBA program, the "S(d) subcontracting program,"] is limited 
to eligibility for subcontracting provisions .... In determining eligibility, 
the SBA presumes social disadvantage based on membership in certain 
minority groups, just as in the 8(a) program, and again appears to 
require an individualized, although "less restrictive," showing of economic 
disadvantage, § 124.106(b). A different set of regulations, however, says 
that members of minority groups wishing to participate in the 8(d) 
subcontracting program are entitled to a race-based presumption of social 
and economic disadvantage. 48 CFR §§ 19.001, 19.703(a)(2) (1994). 
ld. at 2103. The Supreme Court in Adarand confessed "some uncertainty as to 
whether participation in the 8(d) subcontracting program requires an individualized 
showing of economic disadvantage," but noted that, "[i]n any event, in both the S(a) 
and the 8(d) programs, the presumptions of disadvantage are rebuttable if a third 
party comes forward with evidence suggesting that the participant is not, in fact, 
either economically or socially disadvantaged." ld. (citing 13 C.F.R. §§ 124.111(c)-(d), 
124.601-.609 (1994)). 
116. Id. (quoting Surface Transportation and Uniform Relocation Assistance Act of 
1987 (STURAA), Pub. L. 100-17, 101 Stat. 132). Section 106(c)(l) of STURAA provides 
that "not less than 10 percent" of the appropriated funds "shall be expended with 
small business concerns owned and controlled by socially and economically 
disadvantaged individuals." Id. (quoting 101 Stat. 145). 
STURAA adopts the Small Business Act's definition of "socially and 
economically disadvantaged individual," including the applicable 
race-based presumptions, and adds that "women shall be presumed to be 
socially and economically disadvantaged individuals for purposes of this 
subsection." 
Id. (quoting 101 Stat. 146, § 106(c)(2)(B)). 
117. The District Court granted the Government's motion for summary judgment. 
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Skinner, 790 F. Supp. 240 (D. Colo. 1992). The Court 
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peiia, 16 
F.3d 1537 (lOth Cir. 1994). The Tenth Circuit understood the decision in Fullilove v. 
Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980), to have adopted "a lenient standard, resembling 
intermediate scrutiny, in assessing" the constitutionality of federal race-based action. 
Adarand, 16 F.3d at 1544. Applying that "lenient standard," as further developed in 
Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990), the Court of Appeals upheld 
the use of subcontractor compensation clauses. Adarand, 16 F.3d at 1547. 
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decision to certify a business as "disadvantage" rendered the 
classifications at issue classifications based explicitly on race, 
thus requiring some level of heightened scrutiny.118 The Court 
turned then to the central issue of the case, whether federal 
affirmative action programs should be subjected to less rigorous 
judicial scrutiny than state and local programs. 119 
118. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2105. 
119. Reversing its decision in Metro Broadcasting, the Court held that one standard 
should govern review of all affirmative action programs. Two FCC minority preference 
policies were at issue in Metro Broadcasting: the FCC's minority preference policies in 
comparative licensing proceedings and its minority preference policies for "distress 
sales." See 497 U.S. 547, 556-57 (1990). In its comparative licensing process, the FCC 
grants "plus points" for minority ownership when evaluating competing applicants for 
new licenses. The FCC uses numerous criteria when evaluating applicants for 
broadcasting licenses. Those criteria include past broadcast record, efficient use of the 
frequency, character, and proposed program service. See id. (citing Policy Statement 
on Comparative Broadcast Hearings, 1 F.C.C.2d 393 (1965)). In 1978 the FCC 
announced that minority ownership and participation in management would be 
considered as a "plus" factor, to be weighed with all other relevant factors, in 
comparative licensure hearings. See id. (citing WPIX, Inc., 68 F.C.C.2d 381, 411-12 
(1978)). The Metro Broadcasting Company was in competition with Rainbow 
Broadcasting Company for a license to construct and operate a new UHF television 
station in Orlando, Florida. Rainbow was ultimately awarded the license over Metro 
because Rainbow was 90% Hispanic-owned. An FCC Review Board awarded Rainbow 
"substantial enhancement" because it was 90% Hispanic-owned. Rainbow's minority 
enhancement points outweighed Metro's local residence and civic participation points. 
Id. at 558 (citing Metro Broadcasting, Inc., 99 F.C.C.2d 688 (Rev. Bd. 1984)). 
The FCC's minority "distress sale" program permits certain licensees who were in 
jeopardy of losing their licenses to sell their licenses to minority-controlled firms. 
Normally, when a licensee's qualifications to continue to hold a broadcast license 
come into question, the licensee is not allowed to assign or transfer the license until 
the FCC has conducted a hearing resolving the licensee's qualifications. Id. at 557. 
Exceptions to the rule occur when the licensee is either bankrupt or mentally or 
physically disabled. See id. (citing Minority Ownership, 68 F.C.C.2d 979, 983 (1978)). 
The minority preference distress sale policy is an exception to that general rule, 
allo\ving a broadcaster whose license has been designated for a revocation hearing, or 
whose renewal application has been designated for hearing, to assign the license to 
an FCC-approved "minority enterprise" at a distress sale price. See id. (citing 
Commission Policy Regarding the Advancement of Minority Ownership in 
Broadcasting, 92 F.C.C.2d 849, 851 (1982)). The minority ownership must exceed 50% 
or be controlling. The price of the distress sale must not exceed 75% of the fair 
market value. Id. at 558. Rather than endure a protracted hearing over its 
qualifications, the licensee may prefer to sell out to a minority enterprise, even 
though the licensee receives less than it might otherwise have obtained from the sale. 
The assignee must meet the FCC's basic qualifications. 
The Supreme Court upheld both FCC minority preference policies. In a 5-4 
decision written by Justice William Brennan, the Court held that the FCC's policies 
should be judged by the "intermediate scrutiny" standard of equal protection review, 
rather than by "strict scrutiny." Id. at 565. The application of the more lax 
intermediate scrutiny test was surprising because the Court had appeared to be 
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The Court first reviewed the modern history of equal 
protection analysis as applied to the federal government. Many 
early pronouncements of the Court refused to extend any equal 
protection principles to actions of the federal government, on the 
reasoning that the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection 
guarantee extends only to the states. 120 As the Court first began 
to examine federal action under equal protection principles, the 
results were disastrous. The Court in Hirabayashi v. United 
States121 sustained a curfew applicable only to persons of 
Japanese ancestry, and in the infamous Korematsu v. United 
States122 sustained the internment of Japanese-Americans in 
relocation camps. The best that can be said of these decisions is 
that they were the product of wartime hysteria; Congress itself 
would, generations later, recognize the injustice that had been 
done.123 
The first major watershed in this history came in the Supreme 
Court's decision in Bolling v. Sharpe, 124 the federal school 
desegregation decision involving schools in Washington, D.C., 
that was the companion case to Brown v. Board of Education.125 
In Bolling, "the Court for the first time explicitly questioned the 
existence of any difference between the obligations of the Federal 
Government and the States to avoid racial classifications."126 
While the Court in Bolling noted that "the 'equal protection of 
the laws' is a more explicit safeguard of prohibited unfairness 
than 'due process of law,' "127 it concluded that, "[i]n view of 
settling on the strict scrutiny test as the appropriate standard of review for racial 
affinnative action. 
120. See Detroit Bank v. United States, 317 U.S. 329, 337 (1943) ("Unlike the 
Fourteenth Amendment, the Fifth contains no equal protection clause and it provides 
no guaranty against discriminatory legislation by Congress."); Helvering v. Lerner 
Stores Corp., 314 U.S. 463, 468 (1941); LaBelle Iron Works v. United States, 256 
U.S. 377, 392 (1921) ("Reference is made to cases decided under the equal protection 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; but clearly they are not in point. The Fifth 
Amendment has no equal protection clause." (citations omitted)). 
121. 320 u.s. 81 (1943). 
122. 323 u.s. 214 (1944). 
123. See Pub. L. No. 100-383, § 2(a), 102 Stat. 903 (1988) ("The Congress recognizes 
that . . . a grave injustice was done to both citizens and permanent resident aliens of 
Japanese ancestry by the evacuation, relocation, and internment of civilians during 
World War II."). 
124. 347 u.s. 497 (1954). 
125. 347 u.s. 483 (1954). 
126. Adarand Constructors Inc. v. Peiia, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2107 (1995). 
127. Id. (quoting Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954)). 
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[the] decision that the Constitution prohibits the states from 
maintaining racially segregated public schools, it would be 
unthinkable that the same Constitution would impose a lesser 
duty on the Federal Government."128 In all subsequent cases 
other than the affirmative action line of decisions, the Supreme 
Court after Bolling appeared to apply identical equal protection 
standards to all governmental action, without regard to whether 
it was a federal or state program being challenged. 129 As 
Professor Kenneth Karst observed, "[i]n case after case, fifth 
amendment equal protection problems are discussed on the 
assumption that fourteenth amendment precedents are 
controlling. "130 
The affirmative action cases, however, were unique. The 
Supreme Court, in cases such as Regents of the University of 
California v. Bakke, 131 Fullilove v. Klutznick/32 Wygant v. 
Board of Education, 133 Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 134 and 
Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC/35 struggled to achieve 
consensus on the appropriate standard of review. In Wygant and 
Croson, the Court settled on "strict scrutiny'' as the governing 
standard for reviewing race-based affirmative action programs 
implemented by state and local governments, but first in 
Fullilove, and later in Metro Broadcasting, the Court adopted a 
more lax standard for federal affirmative action. Adarand 
brought this two-tiered approach to an end. 
128. Id. (quoting Bolling, 347 U.S. at 500). 
129. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93 (1976) ("Equal protection analysis in 
the Fifth Amendment area is the same as that under the Fourteenth Amendment."); 
Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638 n.2 (1975) ("This Court's approach to 
Fifth Amendment equal protection claims has always been precisely the same as to 
equal protection claims under the Fourteenth Amendment."); Frontiero v. Richardson, 
411 U.S. 677 (1973); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964). 
130. Kenneth L. Karst, The Fifth Amendment's Guarantee of Equal Protection, 55 
N.C. L. REV. 541, 554 (1977). 
131. 438 u.s. 265 (1978). 
132. 448 u.s. 448 (1980). 
133. 476 u.s. 267 (1986). 
134. 488 u.s. 469 (1989). 
135. 497 u.s. 547 (1990). 
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IV. THE FuTuRE OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 
A. The Near-Colorblindness of Adarand 
The Court in Adarand, although confessing that there 
remained ''lingering uncertainty in the details," distilled its 
jurisprudence regarding racial classifications into three general 
propositions, which it labeled "skepticism," "consistency," and 
"congruence."136 By "skepticism," the Court meant that all 
preferences based on racial or ethnic criteria must reserve a 
most searching examination-that is, be subjected to strict 
scrutiny.137 By "consistency," the Court meant that it makes no 
difference what racial or ethnic group is being preferred; "'the 
standard of review under the Equal Protection Clause is not 
dependent on the race of those burdened or benefited by a 
particular classification.' m38 And by "congruence," the Court 
meant that equal protection analysis as applied to the states 
under the Fourteenth Amendment is identical to that applied to 
the federal government under the Fifth. 139 To the extent that 
Metro Broadcasting conflicted with these principles, it was 
overruled. 140 
Having established the standard of review, the Court in 
Adarand did not resolve the question of whether the program 
before it was or was not constitutional. Instead, because the 
lower courts had upheld the program under too lenient a 
standard, the Court remanded the case to them for their initial 
determination of whether, applying strict scrutiny, the programs 
are constitutional.141 However, the Court made some general 
observations about the content of the strict scrutiny standard. 
Most importantly, the Court went out of its way "to dispel the 
notion that strict scrutiny is 'strict in theory, but fatal in 
fact.' "142 There are situations, the Court emphasized, in which 
affirmative action is constitutional: 
136. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pefla, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2111 (1995). 
137. Id. 
138. Id. (quoting Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 494 (1989) (plurality 
opinion)). 
139. Id. 
140. Id. at 2114-18. 
141. Id. at 2118. 
142. Id. at 2117. 
1996] THE GHOSTS OF HOMER PLESSY 
Finally, we wish to dispel the notion that strict scrutiny is 
"strict in theory, but fatal in fact." The unhappy persistence 
of both the practice and the lingering effects of racial 
discrimination against minority groups in this country is an 
unfortunate reality, and government is not disqualified from 
acting in response to it. As recently as 1987, for example, 
every Justice of this Court agreed that the Alabama 
Department of Public Safety's "pervasive, systematic, and 
obstinate discriminatory conduct" justified a narrowly 
tailored race-based remedy. When race-based action is 
necessary to further a compelling interest, such action is 
within constitutional constraints if it satisfies the "narrow 
tailoring" test this Court has set out in previous cases.143 
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Beyond this general admonition that the strict scrutiny 
standard does not absolutely forbid the use of race, however, the 
opinion in Adarand only prolonged, to use the Court's own 
phrase, the ''lingering uncertainty in the details."144 
Concurring opinions were filed in Adarand by Justices Scalia 
and Thomas. Justice Scalia wrote: "Individuals who have been 
wronged by unlawful racial discrimination should be made whole; 
but under our Constitution there can be no such thing as either a 
creditor or a debtor race."145 Although Justice Scalia joined in 
the disposition of the case by the Court, including its application 
of strict scrutiny, he noted that in his view: 
[G]overnment can never have a 'compelling interest' in 
discriminating on the basis of race in order to 'make up' for 
past racial discrimination in the opposite direction. . . . To 
pursue the concept of racial entitlement--even for the most 
admirable and benign of purposes-is to reinforce and 
preserve for future mischief the way of thinking that 
produced race slavery, race privilege and race hatred. In the 
eyes of government, we are just one race here. It is 
American.146 
143. Id. at 2117 (citations omitted). The phrase "strict in theory, but fatal in fact" is 
taken from Justice Thurgood Marshall. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519 
(1980) (Marshall, J., concurring in judgment). The example of the remedies approved 
in the Alabama case referred to in the Court's statement is from United States v. 
Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 167 (1987) (plurality opinion of Brennan, J.). 
144. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2111. 
145. Id. at 2118 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
146. Id. at 2118-19. 
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Justice Thomas expressed quite passionate dislike for all 
affirmative action: 
Government cannot make us equal; it can only recognize, 
respect, and protect us as equal before the law. 
That these programs may have been motivated, in part, by 
good intentions cannot provide refuge from the principle that 
under our Constitution, the government may not make 
distinctions on the basis of race. As far as the Constitution is 
concerned, it is irrelevant whether a government's racial 
classifications are drawn by those who wish to oppress a race 
or by those who have a sincere desire to help those thought 
to be disadvantaged. There can be no doubt that the 
paternalism that appears to lie at the heart of this program 
is at war with the principle of inherent equality that 
underlies and infuses our Constitution. 
These programs not only raise grave constitutional 
questions, they also undermine the moral basis of the equal 
protection principle. Purchased at the price of immeasurable 
human suffering, the equal protection principle reflects our 
Nation's understanding that such classifications ultimately 
have a destructive impact on the individual and our society. 
Unquestionably, "[i]nvidious [racial] discrimination is an 
engine of oppression." It is also true that "[r]emedial" racial 
preferences may reflect "a desire to foster equality in society." 
But there can be no doubt that racial paternalism and its 
unintended consequences can be as poisonous and pernicious 
as any other form of discrimination. So-called "benign" 
discrimination teaches many that because of chronic and 
apparently immutable handicaps, minorities cannot compete 
with them without their patronizing indulgence. Inevitably, 
such programs engender attitudes of superiority or, 
alternatively, provoke resentment among those who believe 
that they have been wronged by the government's use of race. 
These programs stamp minorities with a badge of inferiority 
and may cause them to develop dependencies or to adopt an 
attitude that they are "entitled" to preferences .... 
In my mind, government-sponsored racial discrimination 
based on benign prejudice is just as noxious as discrimination 
inspired by malicious prejudice. In each instance, it is racial 
discrimination, plain and simple.147 
147. Id. at 2119 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) 
(citations and footnote omitted). 
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B. The Diversity Rationale After Adarand 
Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, Souter, and Breyer all dissented. 
The dissenting opinion of Justice Stevens is particularly 
important, for it addresses an important question left open by the 
majority in Adarand: Whether Adarand's overruling of Metro 
Broadcasting reaches only the question of the appropriate 
standard of review, or extends to the other key feature of Metro 
Broadcasting-its reliance on the "diversity" rationale. The 
question of whether public entities such as universities may 
engage in affirmative action to achieve greater diversity is 
central to answering the assertion by the Plessy majority that 
law cannot place the races on an equal social plane. 148 For the 
pursuit of diversity is in many respects the pursuit of that which 
the Plessy majority denied was possible and Justice Harlan 
claimed was essential: the recognition that the destinies of the 
two races are indissolubly linked together. 
In Bakke, 149 Justice Powell approved of the interest of the 
university in achieving a diverse student body as a "compelling" 
interest for the purposes of the strict scrutiny test: 
The fourth goal asserted by petitioner is the attainment of 
a diverse student body. This clearly is a constitutionally 
permissible goal for an institution of higher education. 
Academic freedom, though not a specifically enumerated 
constitutional right, long has been viewed as a special 
concern of the First Amendment. The freedom of a university 
to make its own judgments as to education includes the 
selection of its student body.150 
Justice Powell understood the goal of obtaining a diverse student 
body as among the "four essential freedoms" that comprise the 
"academic freedom" of a university.151 Quoting the words of the 
148. See supra notes 15-40 and accompanying text. 
149. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
150. Id. at 311-12. 
151. Id. at 312 (quoting Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957) 
(Frankfurter, J., concurring)). 
"It is the business of a university to provide that atmosphere which is 
most conducive to speculation, experinlent and creation. It is an 
atmosphere in which there prevail 'the four essential freedoms' of a 
university-to determine for itself on academic grounds who may teach, 
what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted 
to study." 
Id.; see also Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967). 
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President of Princeton University, Justice Powell observed that 
the speculation, experiment, and creation so essential to higher 
education is promoted by a diverse student body: 
[A] great deal of learning occurs informally. It occurs through 
interactions among students of both sexes; of different races, 
religions, and backgrounds; who come from cities and rural 
areas, from various states and countries; who have a wide 
variety of interests, talents, and perspectives; and who are 
able, directly or indirectly, to learn from their differences and 
to stimulate one another to reexamine even their most deeply 
held assumptions about themselves and their world. As a 
wise graduate of ours observed in commenting on this aspect 
of the educational process, 'People do not learn very much 
when they are surrounded only by the likes of 
themselves.' . . . In the nature of things, it is hard to know 
how, and when, and even if, this informal 'learning through 
diversity' actually occurs. It does not occur for everyone. For 
many, however, the unplanned, casual encounters with 
roommates, fellow sufferers in an organic chemistry class, 
student workers in the library, teammates on a basketball 
squad, or other participants in class affairs or student 
government can be subtle and yet powerful sources of 
improved understanding and personal growth.152 
Justice Powell thus concluded that "it is not too much to say that 
the 'nation's future depends upon leaders trained through wide 
exposure' to the ideas and mores of students as diverse as this 
Nation of many peoples."153 Seeking a diverse student body, 
Justice Powell explained, is thus "a goal that is of paramount 
importance in the fulfillment of its mission."154 
The goal of diversity, Justice Powell further argued, is as 
important for professional and graduate education as for the 
Our Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom which 
is of transcendent value to all of us and not merely to the teachers 
concerned. That freedom is therefore a special concern of the First 
Amendment. . . . The Nation's future depends upon leaders trained 
through wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which discovers 
truth "out of a multitude of tongues, [rather] than through any kind of 
authoritative selection." 
Id. (quoting United States v. Associated Press, D.C., 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (1943)). 
152. Id. at 312 n.48 (alterations in original) (quoting William G. Bowen, Admissions 
and the Relevance of Race, PRINCETON ALUMNI WKLY., Sept. 26, 1977, at 7, 9). 
153. Id. at 313. 
154. Id. 
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undergraduate level, noting that "even at the graduate level, our 
tradition and experience lend support to the view that the 
contribution of diversity is substantial."155 Citing Sweatt v. 
Painter, 156 Powell observed that in law schools, for example, the 
exchange of ideas among students of diverse backgrounds is 
critical to the learning experience. 157 
Justice Powell's quarrel with what the University of California 
had done in Bakke to achieve diversity was not with its ends, but 
its means. For Justice Powell, in order for a university's pursuit 
of "diversity" to be constitutionally valid, the pursuit must 
embrace the ideal of diversity in a broad and inclusive sense, and 
not limit that pursuit to race or ethnicity alone: 
Ethnic diversity, however, is only one element in a range 
of factors a university properly may consider in attaining the 
goal of a heterogeneous student body. Although a university 
must have wide discretion in making the sensitive judgments 
as to who should be admitted, constitutional limitations 
protecting individual rights may not be disregarded.158 
The key to Justice Powell's endorsement of the diversity idea 
was that it be pursued in a "unified" admissions system, without 
set-asides or special "tracks" for particular racial or ethnic 
groups: 
It may be assumed that the reservation of a specified 
number of seats in each class for individuals from the 
preferred ethnic groups would contribute to the attainment of 
considerable ethnic diversity in the student body. But 
petitioner's argument that this is the only effective means of 
serving the interest of diversity is seriously flawed. In a most 
fundamental sense the argument misconceives the nature of 
the state interest that would justifY consideration of race or 
ethnic background. It is not an interest in simple ethnic 
155. Id. 
156. 339 u.s. 629 (1950). 
157. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 314. 
The law school, the proving ground for legal learning and practice, 
cannot be effective in isolation from the individuals and institutions with 
which the law interacts. Few students and no one who has practiced law 
would choose to study in an academic vacuum, removed from the 
interplay of ideas and the exchange of views with which the law is 
concerned. 
Id. (citing Sweatt v. Painter, 399 U.S. 629, 634 (1950)). 
158. Id. 
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diversity, in which a specified percentage of the student body 
is in effect guaranteed to be members of selected ethnic 
groups, with the remaining percentage an undifferentiated 
aggregation of students. The diversity that furthers a 
compelling state interest encompasses a far broader array of 
qualifications and characteristics of which racial or ethnic 
origin is but a single though important element. Petitioner's 
special admissions program, focused solely on ethnic 
diversity, would hinder rather than further attainment of 
genuine diversity. 
Nor would the state interest in genuine diversity be served 
by expanding petitioner's two-track system into a multitrack 
program with a prescribed number of seats set aside for each 
identifiable category of applicants. Indeed, it is inconceivable 
that a university would thus pursue the logic of petitioner's 
two-track program to the illogical end of insulating each 
category of applicants with certain desired qualifications from 
competition with all other applicants.159 
Justice Powell then touted, as an example of the appropriate 
and constitutional pursuit of diversity, the admissions process at 
Harvard, in which "ethnic background may be deemed a 'plus' in 
a particular applicant's file, yet it does not insulate the 
individual from comparison with all other candidates for the 
available seats."16° For Justice Powell, this preserved an 
appropriate balance between the goal of diversity and the 
constitutional imperative that government treat individuals as 
159. Id. at 315 (footnote omitted). 
160. Id. at 317. Elaborating, Justice Powell wrote: 
The file of a particular black applicant may be examined for his potential 
contribution to diversity without the factor of race being decisive when 
compared, for example, with that of an applicant identified as an 
Italian-American if the latter is thought to exhibit qualities more likely 
to promote beneficial educational pluralism. Such qualities could include 
exceptional personal talents, unique work or service experience, leadership 
potential, maturity, demonstrated compassion, a history of overcoming 
disadvantage, ability to communicate with the poor, or other 
qualifications deemed important. In short, an admissions program 
operated in this way is flexible enough to consider all pertinent elements 
of diversity in light of the particular qualifications of each applicant, and 
to place them on the same footing for consideration, although not 
necessarily according them the same weight. Indeed, the weight 
attributed to a particular quality may vary from year to year depending 
upon the "mix" both of the student body and the applicants for the 
incoming class. 
Id. at 317-18. 
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individuals, and not fungible commodities of a racial or ethnic 
class: 
This kind of program treats each applicant as an 
individual in the admissions process. The applicant who loses 
out on the last available seat to another candidate receiving a 
"plus" on the basis of ethnic background will not have been 
foreclosed from all consideration for that seat simply because 
he was not the right color or had the wrong surname. It 
would mean only that his combined qualifications, which may 
have included similar nonobjective factors, did not outweigh 
those of the other applicant. His qualifications would have 
been weighed fairly and competitively, and he would have no 
basis to complain of unequal treatment under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.161 
Following Bakke, however, the diversity rationale did not play 
a significant role in many Supreme Court affirmative action 
cases. The issue came up in Wygant v. Jackson Board of 
Education/62 in which Justice Stevens argued that "race is not 
always irrelevant to . . . governmental decisionmaking, "163 and 
the Court, in the opinion of Justice O'Connor, noted in response 
that although the school board in Wygant had relied on an 
interest in providing black teachers to serve as role models for 
black students, that interest "should not be confused with the 
very different goal of promoting racial diversity among the 
faculty."164 J\].stice O'Connor added that, because the school 
board had not relied on an interest in diversity, it was not 
"necessary to discuss the magnitude of that interest or its 
applicability in this case."165 
161. Id. at 318 (footnote omitted). In a footnote, Justice Powell again emphasized 
the "case-by-case" nature of a proper admissions program: 
Universities . . . may make individualized decisions, in which ethnic 
background plays a part, under a presumption of legality and legitimate 
educational purpose. So long as the university proceeds on an 
individualized, case-by-case basis, there is no warrant for judicial 
interference in the academic process. If an applicant can establish that 
the institution does not adhere to a policy of individual comparisons, or 
can show that a systematic exclusion of certain groups results, the 
presumption of legality might be overcome, creating the necessity of 
proving legitimate educational purpose. 
Id. at 319 n.53. 
162. 476 u.s. 267 (1986). 
163. Id. at 314-15 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
164. Id. at 288 n.*. 
165. Id. 
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Prior to Metro Broadcasting, a majority of the Court had not 
yet decided whether the interest in promoting diversity was an 
interest of sufficient magnitude to justify a racial classification. 
Metro Broadcasting, of course, answered that question in the 
affirmative; the FCC did not defend its program on the theory 
that it was remedial, but rather on the theory that it was 
intended to achieve diversity in broadcasting. Justice Stevens, in 
his opinion in Adarand, dealt with whether the diversity aspect 
of Metro Broadcasting had been affected by the Court's ruling, 
and argued that it had not: 
The majority today overrules Metro Broadcasting only insofar 
as it is "inconsistent with [the] holding" that strict scrutiny 
applies to "benign" racial classifications promulgated by the 
Federal Government. The proposition that fostering diversity 
may provide a sufficient interest to justify such a program is 
not inconsistent with the Court's holding today-indeed, the 
question is not remotely presented in this case-and I do not 
take the Court's opinion to diminish that aspect of our 
decision in Metro Broadcasting. 166 
This statement by Justice Stevens is of enormous importance 
for those institutions, such as universities, that often base 
affirmative action programs on the interest in creating diversity 
among students and faculty. If Justice Stevens is correct, those 
programs, most of which have drawn their claim to constitutional 
legitimacy from Justice Powell's famous opinion in Bakke, remain 
constitutionally sound after Adarand, provided they comply with 
the requirements of "narrow tailoring." 
CONCLUSION: WILL WE EVER BANISH HOMER PLESSY'S GHOSTS? 
.Ai3 the contemporary Court struggles toward an ever more 
color-blind Constitution, it is worth considering more carefully 
the spirit of Justice Harlan's famous dissent. We must face 
Harlan head-on. When we do, we find that Justice Harlan and 
his color-blindness turn out to be a great deal more complex than 
the sound-bite "Our Constitution is color-blind" initially reveals. 
For all its moral courage and rhetorical power, for all its 
insistence that the law be color-blind, Harlan is unable, entirely, 
to escape his own time and culture-as the ghosts of his opinion 
166. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peiia, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2127-28 (1995) (citation 
omitted). 
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are unable to escape ours. Justice Harlan saw the world in color, 
and so do we. When I read Harlan's dissent in class each year 
with my students, I ask them what they make of all the openly 
stereotypical allusions to racial and ethnic groups in the opinion. 
Here they are, once again paraded in open view: 
Every true man has pride of race, and under appropriate 
circumstances when the rights of others, his equals before the 
law, are not to be affected, it is his privilege to express such 
pride and to take such action based upon it as to him seems 
proper .... 
The white race deems itself to be the dominant race in this 
country. And so it is, in prestige, in achievements, in 
education, in wealth and in power. So, I doubt not, it will 
continue to be for all time, if it remains true to its great 
heritage and holds fast to the principles of constitutional 
liberty .... 
. . . This question is not met by the suggestion that social 
equality cannot exist between the white and black races in 
this country. That argument, if it can be properly regarded as 
one, is scarcely worthy of consideration; for social equality no 
more exists between two races when travelling in a passenger 
coach or a public highway than when members of the same 
races sit by each other in a street car or in the jury box, or 
stand or sit with each other in a political assembly, or when 
they use in common the streets of a city or town, or when 
they are in the same room for the purpose of having their 
names placed on the registry of voters, or when they 
approach the ballot-box in order to exercise the high privilege 
of voting. 
There is a race so different from our own that we do not 
permit those belonging to it to become citizens of the United 
States. Persons belonging to it are, with few exceptions, 
absolutely excluded from our country. I allude to the Chinese 
race. But by the statute in question, a Chinaman can ride in 
the same passenger coach with white citizens of the United 
States, while citizens of the black race in Louisiana, many of 
whom, perhaps, risked their lives for the preservation of the 
Union, who are entitled, by law, to participate in the political 
control of the State and nation, who are not excluded, by law 
or by reason of their race, from public stations of any kind, 
and who have all the legal rights that belong to white 
citizens, are yet declared to be criminals, liable to 
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imprisonment, if they ride in a public coach occupied by 
citizens of the white race.167 
Now what are we to make of these passages? They are 
haunting, too, but in a different and more vivid hue than 
Harlan's color-blind Constitution. For if the Constitution, to 
Justice Harlan, was color-blind, he surely was not. And neither 
was his celebrated opinion. 
And for all Harlan's moving rhetoric, the Constitution he 
expounded was not color-blind, not prior to the Civil War, not 
after, not now. We know that the Framers of the Fourteenth 
Amendment did not understand the law they were enacting as 
turning the Constitution color-blind-they did not understand, 
for example, the Fourteenth Amendment to abolish racially 
segregated public schools. 168 
Witness Justice Harlan's actions in 1899, three years after 
Plessy, when the Court for the first time heard a challenge to 
racially separate schools. In Richmond County, Georgia, the 
district ran separate high schools for blacks, white girls, and 
white boys. When the district's school buildings became 
overcrowded, the black high school was shut down and converted 
into an elementary school, leaving black high school children in 
the district with no public school to attend. Relying on the 
majority opinion in Plessy, parents of the black children sued, 
claiming that at the very least they were entitled to separate but 
equal schools. The Supreme Court in Cumming v. County Board 
of Education 169 rejected their claim in a unanimous opinion 
written by none other than Justice Harlan himself. Justice 
Harlan's opinion in Cumming has no hint of candor or moral 
outrage. It is a whitewash job well worthy of the Plessy majority. 
There was in Cumming some sleight-of-hand by the school 
district. But unlike in Plessy, where Justice Harlan cut through 
all euphemism and pretext, in Cumming he positively aided and 
abetted. The district had a tax-supported high school for white 
females. It had no tax-supported school for white males, as 
Harlan explained the facts, although it did use tax moneys to 
"assist" a "private" school in the county for white males. There 
167. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 554, 559, 561 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
168. Alexander M. Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 
69 HAR.v. L. REV. 1, 56 (1955); Laurence H. Tribe, In What Vision of the Constitution 
Must the Law be Color-Blind?, 20 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 201, 204 (1986). 
169. 175 u.s. 528 (1899). 
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was no high school for black males or females that either got 
direct tax support or any financial assistance from the school 
district. On this set of facts, Justice Harlan simply flitted away 
the constitutional claim, arguing that, if anything, it was a case 
of sex discrimination, not race discrimination: 
The only complaint is that these plaintiffs, being taxpayers, 
are debarred the privilege of sending their children to a high 
school which is not a free school, but one where tuition is 
charged, and that a portion of the school fund, raised by 
taxation, is appropriated to sustain white high schools to 
which negroes are not admitted. We think we have shown 
that it was in the discretion of the Board to establish high 
schools. It being in their discretion, they could, without a 
violation of the law or of any constitution, devote a portion of 
the taxes collected for school purposes to the support of this 
high school for white girls and to assist a county 
denominational high school for boys. In our opinion, it is 
impracticable to distribute taxes equally. The appropriation 
of a portion of the taxes for a white girls' high school is not 
more discrimination against these colored plaintiffs than it is 
against many white people in the county. A taxpayer who has 
boys and no girls of a school age has as much right to 
complain of the unequal distribution of the taxes to a girls' 
high school as have these plaintiffs. The action of the Board 
appears to us to be more a discrimination as to sex than it 
does as to race. 170 
This is a remarkable passage on several counts. First, note 
that the possibility that the greater form of discrimination here 
may be discrimination based on gender seems to be introduced as 
no more than a rhetorical twitter. This ghost has largely been 
exorcized from our constitutional system, although the Supreme 
Court even in its 1995-96 term is entertaining the question of 
separate but equal for all-male military academies. More 
important, however, is Justice Harlan's astonishing treatment of 
the race issue in Cumming. Justice Harlan's blindness here is 
not to color but to basic justice, for surely the principle of Plessy 
must have meant, at minimum, that when tax moneys are used 
to establish some program of public largess, such as a school 
system, there must be equal opportunities for both races, even if 
"separate." Consider further his cavalier analysis of the Georgia 
170. Id. at 542-43. 
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constitutional provision171 that required separation of the races 
in public schools: 
It was said at the argument that the vice in the common 
school system of Georgia was the requirement that the white 
and colored children of the State be educated in separate 
schools. But we need not consider that question in this case. 
No such issue was made in the pleadings. Indeed, the 
plaintiffs distinctly state that they have no objection to the 
tax in question so far as levied for the support of primary, 
intermediate and grammar schools, in the management of 
which the rule as to the separation of races is enforced. We 
must dispose of the case as it is presented by the record. 
The plaintiffs in error complain that the Board of 
Education used the funds in its hands to assist in 
maintaining a high school for white children without 
providing a similar school for colored children. The 
substantial relief asked is an injunction that would either 
impair the efficiency of the high school provided for white 
children or compel the Board to close it. But if that were 
done, the result would only be to take from white children 
educational privileges enjoyed by them, without giving to 
colored children additional opportunities for the education 
furnished in high schools. The colored school children of the 
county would not be advanced in the matter of their 
education by a decree compelling the defendant Board to 
cease giving support to a high school for white children. The 
Board had before it the question whether it should maintain, 
under its control, a high school for about sixty colored 
children or withhold the benefits of education in primary 
schools from three hundred children of the same race. It was 
impossible, the Board believed, to give educational facilities 
to the three hundred colored children who were unprovided 
for, if it maintained a separate school for the sixty children 
who wished to have a high school education. Its decision was 
in the interest of the greater number of colored children, 
leaving the smaller number to obtain a high school education 
171. See id. at 543. 
"There shall be a thorough system of common schools for the education 
of children in the elementary branches of an English education only, as 
nearly uniform as practicable, the expenses of which shall be provided for 
by taxation, or otherwise. The schools shall be free to all children of the 
State, but separate schools shall be provided for the white and colored 
races." 
ld. (quoting GA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1). 
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in existing private institutions at an expense not beyond that 
incurred in the high school discontinued by the Board.172 
This from the Justice who wrote that our Constitution is color-
blind, and that "[t]here is no caste here." Making matters 
worse-indeed, charting an argumentative strategy that would be 
used to block efforts to overturn Jim Crow over the next 
century-Harlan proceeded to defend the blatant discrimination 
in Cumming with the soothing insulation of federalism and 
states' rights: 
We may add that while all admit that the benefits and 
burdens of public taxation must be shared by citizens without 
discrimination against any class on account of their race, the 
education of the people in schools maintained by state 
taxation is a matter belonging to the respective States, and 
any interference on the part of Federal authority with the 
management of such schools cannot be justified except in the 
case of a clear and unmistakable disregard of rights secured 
by the supreme law of the land. We have here no such case to 
be determined .... 173 
George Wallace, Lester Maddox, or Orval Faubus at their worst 
could not have said it better. 
Laws that impose separation are not the same, morally or 
constitutionally, as laws that promote combination. The moral 
principle animating the advocates of a truly color-blind 
Constitution is certainly powerful. It is the principle that race-
consciousness is wrong, wrong in all contexts, perhaps, but at the 
very least, wrong when the government indulges in it. But there 
are counter-principles of substantial weight. The lingering 
difficulty many African-Americans continue to have in placing 
themselves in the nation's competitive public and private 
institutions quite simply is, without doubt, caused in part by the 
lingering effects of hundreds of years of group degradation. 
A decade after Brown v. Board of Education, 174 when the 
Supreme Court held that a mere move by a school district to a 
"freedom of choice" plan was not sufficient to dismantle, root and 
branch, the regime of separate but equal, the Court well and 
properly understood that so many years of evil will not be 
172. Id. at 543·44. 
173. Id. at 545. 
174. 347 u.s. 483 (1954). 
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undone by a surface move to "neutrality." Many school boards 
responded to the Brown ruling first by dragging their feet or 
resisting, and then finally by adopting "freedom of choice" plans 
that let school children enroll in any school in the school district. 
A freedom of choice plan is ostensibly a perfect form of equality, 
and to a pure process thinker may seem like all any school board 
could ever be asked to do. The problem, however, is that in most 
of those freedom of choice school districts, black children 
continued to attend the exclusively black schools and white 
children the exclusively white schools, and so it appeared in 
reality as if nothing had changed. In Green v. County School 
Board of New Kent County/75 the Court in 1968 announced that 
simply moving to such a freedom of choice regime was not good 
enough. If a school district had been guilty of intentional 
segregation of its students, and thus guilty of a constitutional 
violation under Brown, the remedy must be more aggressive; the 
school district was under an "affirmative duty" to dismantle the 
vestiges of the discriminatory system "root and branch." The 
Court wanted results; it wanted them now. In Swann v. 
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 176 Chief Justice 
Burger, writing for a unanimous Court, stated that school boards 
could voluntarily adopt prescribed ratios of black students to 
white students for each school within a system, even in the 
absence of a constitutional violation, 177 although the Court also 
admonished that it would not approve the notion that there is a 
"substantive constitutional right" to "any particular degree of 
racial balance or mixing."178 The Court in Swann recognized the 
power of a school board faced with a history of segregation to use 
its awareness of the racial imbalance as a starting point for 
voluntarily dismantling a dual school system.179 
If we understand that affirmative steps were required to 
dismantle the formal mechanisms of separate but equal, why do 
175. 391 u.s. 430 (1968). 
176. 402 u.s. 1 (1971). 
177. ld. at 16. 
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CHARLOTTE SCHOOLS (1995). See also United States v. Fordice, 112 S. Ct. 2727 (1992) 
(applying Brown principles to the desegregation of higher education in Mississippi). 
For an excellent treatment of Fordice, see Kay P. Kindred, Civil Rights and Higher 
Education, in A YEAR IN THE LIFE OF THE SUPREME COURT 208-30 (Rodney Smolla 
ed., 1995). 
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we find it so difficult to understand that affirmative steps are 
required to dismantle the psychological and cultural effects? AE, 
Kimberle Williams Crenshaw has explained, the subordination of 
blacks in American society exists on many levels. 18° Formal, 
legal subordination of the type approved in Plessy is surely the 
worst, for it legitimizes and encourages all other forms of 
subordination, and is fed by a perverse normative vision of 
equality, a vision in which people of color are not full members of 
the polity. Other forms of subordination persist, however, long 
after formal legal subordination is abolished. Material 
subordination exists in the form of discrimination in employment, 
housing, or education, as well as in lives degraded by poverty, 
poor health care, and violence.181 Symbolic subordination 
persists in the pervasiveness of a race-consciousness that 
embraces myths of inferiority.182 Taking down the "Whites 
Only'' signs was an important legal step, for it rejected the 
principle of racial supremacy as the nation's moral vision, but 
can hardly have been expected to cure material or symbolic 
subordination, and indeed has not. 
Quite to the contrary, the elimination of formal legal 
subordination, when juxtaposed with the momentum of economic 
subordination and cultural prejudice that had developed for three 
centuries, may actually have fed the persistence of prejudice. 
Here is the simple-minded equation: African-Americans no longer 
have any formal barriers to equal opportunity, but many still are 
not making it. They must be inferior after all. And "[i]f whites 
believe that Blacks, because they are unambitious or inferior, get 
what they deserve, it becomes that much harder to convince 
whites that something is wrong with the entire system."183 
Both sides in the affirmative action debate can summon moral 
indignation. Those who advocate color-blindness can argue that 
affirmative action is, in its way, racist, for it continues the habits 
and patterns of race-consciousness, and indulges the assumption 
that minority groups cannot make it on their own.184 Those who 
defend affirmative action can argue that the advocates of color-
180. Kimberle Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation 
and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1377-78 (1988). 
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blindness are racist in their own way. For although they proudly 
tout formal equality, the practical impact of their policies and 
their insensitivity to the causal lines that still emanate from 
slavery, Dred Scott, Plessy, and their many ghosts, make them 
enemies of persons of color. 
For many African-Americans, one of the bewildering aspects of 
obstructionist principles advanced by some whites is the 
apparently sincere request that the damage done to African-
Americans is "nothing personal." In the words of Derrick Bell's 
character Geneva Crenshaw: 
"You know, friend, we civil rights lawyers spend our lives 
confronting whites in power with the obvious racial bias in 
their laws or policies, and while, as you know, the litany of 
their possible exculpatory responses is as long as life, they all 
boil down to: 'That's the way the world is. We did not make 
the rules, we simply play by them, and you really have no 
alternative but to do the same. Please don't take it 
personally.' "185 
To escalate the rhetoric in this way damages both sides, however, 
and only sets back the cause of racial justice in America. 
Our dialogue would be more fruitful if each side recognized the 
good faith of the other, and conceded to the other the legitimacy 
of the other's animating moral impulses. Those against 
affirmative action should understand and empathize with the 
world view of those who advocate it. The mainstream advocates 
of affirmative action do not seek a system of racial spoils. They 
do not seek to perpetuate stereotypes and stigma. They do not 
argue that people of color cannot make it in society without help. 
They argue, rather, that many persons of color still suffer the 
lingering effects of past discrimination, and that Justice Harlan 
was right in his prophecy that the destinies of the two races are 
"indissolubly linked together." Moderate and flexible affirmative 
action policies that genuinely diversify our public and private 
institutions are the only path toward achieving in fact the links 
that persons of all racial and ethnic groups must feel toward one 
another if future community in this nation is to be possible. 
The issue of stigma, for example, is far more complex than the 
public rhetoric of opponents of affirmative action admit. A law 
stigmatizes when it places on an individual a symbol that 
185. DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED 44 (1987). 
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degrades or humiliates.186 It is the cultural and historical 
context that makes the symbol degrading; thus, as Charles 
Lawrence explains, separate-but-equal bathrooms for men and 
women are not ordinarily understood in our culture as degrading 
to either sex; while separate-but-equal bathrooms for blacks and 
whites are.187 We understand from our cultural and historical 
experience that the message communicated by a bathroom sign 
that says ''Whites Only'' is that blacks are unfit to defecate there: 
blacks are dirty, or dangerous, or less than fully human-their 
presence can defile and contaminate even a bathroom. 
Affirmative action programs in modern times simply do not 
carry any equivalent social and cultural message of stigma. 
Indeed, programs that are premised on enhancing diversity may 
actually be understood to carry a positive message about the 
person of color admitted to an institution: the message being that 
the institution values and needs the individual for the 
experiences and viewpoints that the individual brings to the 
community. 
At the same time, proponents of affirmative action must 
recognize the validity of the moral principle advanced by 
opponents of affirmative action, and the cogency of many of the 
arguments that are advanced against its more draconian forms. 
There should come a day when such programs are no longer 
needed or tolerated. But we are not there yet. -
illtimately, the pursuit of genuine racial equality in the 
country must focus on substance and not on form. Self-reliance 
and personal responsibility are crucial. The emphasis on those 
values in forums such as the Million Man March are an 
important symbolic step. A serious grappling with the social 
infrastructure of society, including meaningful progress in 
education, drug abuse, child care and family support, welfare 
reform, and crime are obviously the most important of all. But 
the single most critical determinant of success will be our ability 
to foster cross-racial tolerance and community. This will require 
a continued emphasis on policies of inclusion, such as affirmative 
action, but in forms that do everything possible to meet the 
legitimate objections to the excesses of some such policies, forms 
that create the least moral backlash. It is only through these 
186. Charles R. Lawrence, III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning 
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efforts that we have any hope of finally banishing the ghosts of 
Homer Plessy. 
